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BEARING CHILDREN, BEARING RISKS: FEMINIST
LEADERSHIP FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION OF
COMPENSATED SURROGACY IN THE UNITED STATES
Sara L. Ainsworth *
Abstract: Compensated surrogacy—an arrangement in which a woman carries and gives
birth to a child for someone else in exchange for money—intimately affects women. Yet,
feminist law reformers have not led efforts to regulate this practice in the United States. Their
absence is notable given the significant influence of feminist lawmaking in a host of other
areas where women’s interests are at stake. This lack of feminist law reform leadership can
be understood, however, in light of the complex issues that surrogacy raises—complexity
that has long divided feminists.
In response to efforts to pass surrogacy legislation in Washington State in 2010, Legal
Voice, a women’s rights organization founded in 1978, worked to develop a progressive,
feminist approach to compensated surrogacy. The organization adopted a framework based
primarily on two schools of feminist legal thought—an anti-essentialist analysis and a
pragmatic approach—under the overarching goal of promoting reproductive justice. This
Article proposes the application of these principles to the development of any surrogacy
legislation. However, my primary purpose is to urge feminist law advocates to take
leadership of surrogacy law reform. Whatever the feminist objections to the practice, people
increasingly engage in surrogacy arrangements to create families and to help others to do so.
But it is the women who hold the least power and face the highest risk of economic
exploitation who bear the most significant risks in these arrangements. Thus, it is imperative
that progressive feminists meet the challenge of addressing the complexity of compensated
surrogacy, and develop a shared agenda for ensuring reproductive justice in the context of
assisted reproductive technologies.

*

Sara L. Ainsworth is the Director of Legal Advocacy at National Advocates for Pregnant Women,
a non-profit organization that works to secure the human and civil rights of all women, focusing
particularly on pregnant and parenting women, and those who are most vulnerable to state control
and punishment—low income women, women of color, and women with substance addictions.
From 2002 through 2011 she was senior counsel at Legal Voice, a regional non-profit organization
dedicated to advancing women’s legal rights in the northwest states. Ms. Ainsworth has taught
reproductive rights and justice, poverty law, and gender violence as a lecturer at the University of
Washington School of Law and as Visiting Assistant Professor at Seattle University School of Law.
I appreciate the editors of the Washington Law Review for spotlighting the issue of regulating
compensated surrogacy. This Article grew out of the hard work of Legal Voice and its dedicated
staff (especially Lisa Stone and Pamela Crone) and numerous brilliant volunteers who contributed
their thoughtful research and analysis to the Legal Voice Assisted Reproductive Technologies
workgroup. I also wish to thank Sujatha Jesudason and Lynn Paltrow, whose work and
conversations inspired me and greatly informed this piece.
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INTRODUCTION
Whatever its potential for creating loving families and fairly
compensating women’s labor, or for harming people whose lives and
choices are constrained by oppressive legal and social structures,
compensated surrogacy implicates every area of feminist concern.
Understanding this, feminist theorists and academics have been deeply
engaged for almost three decades in considering the complexities of
compensated surrogacy. Yet, women’s rights groups and feminist law
reformers outside of academia have not typically led the development of
jurisprudence or the efforts to regulate this practice in the United States. 1
This absence contrasts starkly with proactive feminist work in the
areas of domestic and sexual violence law reform, reproductive rights
jurisprudence, pay and labor equality, lesbian family recognition, and
family laws generally. 2 It can be understood, however, in light of the
complex issues of gender and sexual orientation equality, racism,
colonialism, wealth inequality, autonomy, health, and bioethics that
surrogacy raises. 3 This complexity has long divided feminists, both in
feminist legal thought and in the field of women’s legal rights. 4
This lack of consensus may help explain why Legal Voice, founded in
1978 as the Northwest Women’s Law Center and a leading voice on

1. Sociologist Susan Markens describes the reactive (rather than proactive) efforts of women’s
rights advocates, and the conflict between women’s groups, in state legislative efforts to ban or
regulate surrogacy in the 1980s and early 1990s. SUSAN MARKENS, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 156–70 (2007); see also Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate
Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, in APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO
WOMEN’S LIVES: SEX, VIOLENCE, WORK, AND REPRODUCTION 1092, 1092 (D. Kelly Weisberg &
Ronnie J. Steinberg eds., 1996) (introducing arguments in favor of legal enforcement of surrogacy
contracts with an explanation of the controversy among feminists in the late 1980s). But see
Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
109, 115–21 (2009) (describing the feminist response to surrogacy as unified in opposition to
surrogacy in the late 1980s, and growing more muted in the years since).
2. See generally LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM (2011) (feminist law reform was critical to the legal recognition of domestic
violence, although the legal response has not met the needs of all women and their families);
Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal Theory, Feminist Lawmaking,
and the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 249 (1998) (noting the influence of feminist legal
theory on generations of advocates for women’s legal rights and its role in law reform in numerous
areas affecting women’s interests).
3. See infra Part I (exploring this complexity more thoroughly).
4. See MARKENS, supra note 1, at 156–62 (relating the conflict among California women’s rights
organizations responding to proposed surrogacy legislation in the late 1980s); Pamela LauferUkeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial Intimacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1223, 1223–26 (2013)
(providing a succinct overview of the surrogacy debate).
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women’s issues in Washington State’s courts and legislature, 5 was
missing from the debate during the state’s first legislative response to
surrogacy. In 1989, the year after the notorious Baby M decision in New
Jersey, 6 Washington State banned compensated surrogacy. 7 The
Washington Legislature did not reconsider the issue—and women’s
rights advocates never raised it—until a gay legislator lawyer, the father
of children born to a woman acting as surrogate, proposed lifting the ban
in 2010. 8
Just as the practice of compensated surrogacy had evolved, so had
Legal Voice’s willingness to engage with the issue. In 2010, the
organization recognized the imperative of bringing a progressive,
feminist voice to the legislative arena—a voice informed as much as
possible by the experience of women acting as surrogates. After two
years of community engagement, study, and introspection, Legal Voice
ultimately developed a progressive, feminist framework for considering
surrogacy and its legal and social implications for women. 9 The
framework is a set of principles, based primarily on two schools of
feminist legal thought—an anti-essentialist analysis and a pragmatic
approach—under the overarching goal of promoting reproductive
justice. 10
5. See About Us, LEGAL VOICE, http://www.legalvoice.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
6. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.230 (2012) (originally enacted in 1989).
8. H.R. 2793, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2010); Terry J. Price, The Future of Compensated
Surrogacy in Washington: Anytime Soon?, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1311 (2014) (providing a
comprehensive overview of the proposed Washington legislation); see also Molly Rosbach, Bill
Would Allow Paying Surrogate Mothers in Wash., SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 15, 2011),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2014504976_apwaxgrsurrogatemothers3rdldwritethru.html.
9. Transgender people may also become intended parents through a surrogacy arrangement, and
certainly a transgender person with the capacity to become pregnant could act as a surrogate too.
However, literature on the issue is limited to discussions of transgender people acting as intended
parents, rather than acting as surrogates. In a comprehensive legal guidebook for transgender
people, Kylar Broadus and Shannon Price Minter discuss the possibility of transgender parents as
intended parents (rather than as people acting as surrogates). Kylar W. Broadus & Shannon Price
Minter, Legal Issues, in TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES, A RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER
COMMUNITY 174, 174–202 (Laura Erickson-Schroth ed., 2010). Another resource on transgender,
lesbian, gay, and bisexual health issues includes a brief discussion of surrogacy, assuming
transgender people are intended parents, not surrogates. HARVEY J. MAKADON ET AL., THE
FENWAY GUIDE TO LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER HEALTH 117–18 (2008). These
materials, as well as media reports, academic writings, and anecdotal reports from women acting as
surrogates indicate that the vast majority of people who become surrogates identify as women, and
are identified as such in the legislative debates over surrogacy. For these reasons, I use the gendered
phrase “women acting as surrogates” throughout this article. On a different note, I also use this term
because I find “surrogate” and “gestator,” the terms commonly used in this setting, dehumanizing.
10. Reproductive justice is not a replacement term for reproductive rights or abortion rights.
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As a former Legal Voice attorney who helped to develop this
response, I write in part to share this framework and urge the application
of these principles to the development of any surrogacy legislation.
However, Legal Voice was not the first to offer a framework and model
for surrogacy regulation. 11 What I seek to add to the discussion is a call
to feminist law reform projects to develop a shared agenda for ensuring
reproductive justice in the context of assisted reproductive technologies,
and, most importantly, to take leadership in the field of surrogacy
regulation. The risks of compensated surrogacy arrangements are
primarily borne by the women acting as surrogates, who typically hold
less power than other parties to these arrangements and are more likely
to be subject to economic exploitation. 12 Progressive feminists thus must
meet the challenge of addressing surrogacy’s complexity in the
legislatures and the courts. This work should focus on ensuring the
humanity and dignity of the women whose interests are most at stake in
the surrogacy debate.
In Part I of this Article, I explore some of the primary feminist
concerns about compensated surrogacy, including one that has been less
examined, and in Part II, I consider the actual experience of surrogacy as
currently practiced in states where it is legal in the United States. In Part
III, I describe progressive feminist principles for regulating surrogacy
that draw from pragmatic feminism, an anti-essentialist approach, and
reproductive justice. Finally, in Part IV, I apply those principles to
specific provisions of proposed surrogacy regulation, and in conclusion,
argue that surrogacy will continue to put women acting as surrogates at
risk if feminist law reformers fail to assume leadership of proactive
Forward Together (formerly Asian Communities for Reproductive Justice) states that reproductive
justice exists
when all people have the social, political and economic power and resources to make healthy
decisions about our gender, bodies, sexuality and families for our selves and our communities.
Reproductive Justice aims to transform power inequities and create long-term systemic change,
and therefore relies on the leadership of communities most impacted by reproductive
oppression.
COMMUNITIES
FOR
REPROD.
JUST.,
What
Is
Reproductive
Justice?,
ASIAN
http://strongfamiliesmovement.org/what-is-reproductive-justice (last visited Oct. 5, 2014); see also
infra Part III.
11. See Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate
Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2346 (1995); Abby Brandel, Legislating Surrogacy: A Partial
Answer to Feminist Criticism, 54 MD. L. REV. 488 (1995); Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 4; Katherine
Leiber, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique of Surrogacy be Answered?, 68 IND. L. J. 205,
225–32 (1992); Jessica H. Munyon, Protectionism and Freedom of Contract: The Erosion of
Female Autonomy in Surrogacy Decisions, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 717, 720 (2003).
12. The experiences of people who are parties to reproductive tourism in India and other
countries provide powerful examples of this disparity. See infra Part I.
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efforts to regulate surrogacy in the United States.
I.

COMPLEXITIES OF SURROGACY THROUGH A FEMINIST
LENS

Compensated surrogacy 13 garnered national attention in the late 1980s
when Mary Beth Whitehead agreed, in exchange for $10,000, to become
pregnant and give the child to William and Elizabeth Stern. William
provided the sperm; Elizabeth, his wife, was not biologically related to
the child. 14 After she relinquished the baby to the Sterns, Mary Beth
Whitehead changed her mind. 15 The resulting legal conflict made
national headlines, 16 and led to both a surge in legislation 17 (usually to
ban surrogacy) and significant feminist engagement with the subject.18
As feminist theory is not monolithic, the responses from feminists varied
dramatically. 19
13. Compensated surrogacy—the agreement to bear a child for someone else in exchange for
money—is also called commercial surrogacy. While the second term is also apt, it connotes a mere
market exchange and ignores the empirical and anecdotal evidence that shows that these agreements
have deep emotional meaning to the parties. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 4, at 1227 (arguing that
surrogacy arrangements are both commercial and intimate exchanges and that this hybrid nature of
the contract is not adequately recognized under current legal structures). Accordingly, I use the term
“compensated surrogacy” throughout this Article.
14. This type of surrogacy arrangement—where the woman who carries the child is also the
genetic mother—is known as “traditional” surrogacy. “Gestational” surrogacy, in contrast, is an
arrangement where a physician implants an embryo created by the egg and sperm of other parties
(typically, but not always, from one or more of the intended parents) into the uterus of the woman
acting as surrogate. Vasanti Jadva et al., Surrogacy: The Experiences of Surrogate Mothers, 18
HUM. REPROD. 2196, 2196 (2003).
15. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235–37 (N.J. 1988).
16. See, e.g., Robert Hanley, Father of Baby M Granted Custody; Contract Upheld; Surrogacy Is
Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1987, at A1. See also MARKENS, supra note 1, at 120 (identifying 270
articles written about surrogacy and the Baby M case during the custody trial, and ninety-nine
additional articles dedicated to the court’s decision in 1988). It appears that the press is reluctant to
let go of the controversy; in May of 2014, the New York Times revisited the case. Clyde Haberman,
Baby M and the Question of Surrogate Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/us/baby-m-and-the-question-of-surrogate-motherhood.html.
17. See MARKENS, supra note 1, at 22; Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: A Constitutional
Law Professor’s Musings on Circumventing Washington State’s Criminal Prohibition on
Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1235, 1285−87 (2014).
18. MARKENS, supra note 1, at 16–17. Some of the feminist writings on surrogacy from that time
period include: MARTHA FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN ISSUES
(1990); CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989); Andrews, supra note
1; and Katha Pollitt, The Strange Case of Baby M, THE NATION (May 23, 1987),
http://www.thenation.com/article/strange-case-baby-m# (critiquing the Baby M decision and
arguing that compensated surrogacy “bear[s] an uncanny resemblance to the all-sales-final style of a
used-car lot”).
19. See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Lisa Mccauley Rarles, In the Matter of Baby M, 14 WOMEN’S RTS.
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A group of prominent feminists argued against the practice of
compensated surrogacy in an amicus brief filed in the Baby M case. 20
While part of their concern was for the way in which Mary Beth
Whitehead’s parenting had been maligned by the court and in the press
for absurd and sexist reasons, 21 they also argued that surrogacy exploited
poor women and commodified women’s bodies. 22 Liberal feminists
disagreed, and argued that states should permit compensated surrogacy
to ensure a woman’s right to self-determination and to fairly compensate
her for what is inarguably difficult and risky work. 23 Critical race
scholars urged a comparison to the ways in which the bodies of women
of color have been long controlled and targeted for impositions and
restrictions on their childbearing and parenting, and expressed concerns
with the ability of a nation so steeped in racial injustice to prevent
further inequities and exploitation of the bodies and lives of women of
color. 24
Since the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Baby M decision in 1988, the
practice and empirical understanding of compensated surrogacy has
evolved. But the lack of consensus in feminist thought is still present,
and, I argue, has stymied the ability of feminist law reformers, in most
instances, to meaningfully engage in the legal and legislative response to
surrogacy. This is particularly troubling because, as Susan Markens
demonstrates in her book Surrogate Motherhood, the legislative
discussion around surrogacy invariably casts it as a “women’s issue.” 25
When all claim to promote women’s rights, the voice of feminist law
reformers—so present in molding the law affecting sexual and domestic
violence, family laws, reproductive rights, and employment equality—is
sidelined. That is especially true when those who can legitimately speak
for women’s interests present divergent views on the issue.
While feminists should continue the dialogue and ultimately take
ownership of the question of compensated surrogacy, there are powerful
L. REP. 243, 249 (1992).
20. Elizabeth Mehren, Feminists Fight Court Ruling in Baby M Decision: Steinem, Friedan,
Chesler, French Among Supporters, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1987, at 1.
21. Iver Peterson, Fitness Test for Baby M’s Mother Unfair, Feminists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
1987, at B1.
22. Mehren, supra note 20.
23. See generally, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, supra note 1.
24. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 276–85 (1st ed. 1999); Anita L. Allen, The Black Surrogate Mother, 8
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 17, 19 (1991) (“Without a per se ban on commercial surrogacy, it is not
clear that poor and Black women can be protected from the risks of surrogacy arrangements.”).
25. MARKENS, supra note 1, at 62–66.
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reasons for holding conflicted views on the issue. Numerous scholars,
lawyers, and reporters have reflected on the complex questions of
commercial surrogacy. Reconsidering some of those concerns here is
necessary to explain the tensions facing women’s rights supporters in
crafting a progressive, feminist response to compensated surrogacy.
While the complexities are many, 26 I focus on four that I believe are
critical to consider in a progressive approach to surrogacy regulation: (1)
the risks of exploitation, especially for low-income women of color and
women acting as surrogates for people from other countries; (2) the
relationship between women’s health, health care access, and assisted
reproductive technologies; (3) the intersection of surrogacy with the
rights to family formation for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
queer (LGBTQ) people, and the related influence of discourse that
emphasizes genetic relationship to children; and finally (4) how
surrogacy discourse and practices affect people too often excluded from
the dialogue, specifically people with disabilities.
A. The Risk of Exploitation
Of all the possible objections to allowing compensated surrogacy to
flourish, the one that has been most often articulated—by feminists and
non-feminists alike—is the fear that women acting as surrogates will be
exploited. Proponents of this viewpoint urge that the possibility of acting
as a surrogate to earn money will encourage women to become
surrogates because other financial options are unavailable to them. 27
26. See, e.g., Susan Berke Fogel et al., Invoking Choice When Discussing Surrogacy as a
Feminist Concern Is a Mistake, RH REALITY CHECK (Apr. 23, 2014), http://rhrealitycheck.org/
article/2014/04/23/invoking-choice-discussing-surrogacy-feminist-concern-mistake/ (urging that a
simplistic assertion of “choice” as the answer to the dilemmas of surrogacy elides the many difficult
social justice questions inherent in “contract pregnancy,” including questions of class, cross-border
surrogacy, and reproductive autonomy). For a thorough overview of the feminist response in the
context of surrogacy in India (addressed infra) see Birthing a Market: A Study on Commercial
Surrogacy, SAMA–RESOURCE GROUP FOR WOMEN & HEALTH, http://www.samawomenshealth.org/
downloads/Birthing%20A%20Market.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Birthing a Market].
27. See, e.g., Barbara Katz Rothman, Daddy Plants a Seed: Personhood Under Patriarchy, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1246 (1996) (arguing “[y]ou have only to look at the poor women of color
tending their white affluent charges in the playgrounds of every American city to understand which
women will be carrying valued white babies in their bellies as a cheap service”). Another common
objection to surrogacy, that I will not address here, is that it turns children into commodities. See
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (in the context of upholding a gestational
surrogacy contract, the court briefly considers then rejects these arguments); MARGARET JANE
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 64 (1996). “Baby-selling” is also one of the primary objections
offered by social conservatives who oppose surrogacy. See, e.g., Wesley J. Smith, Biological
Colonialism Surrogacy Fraudsters, NATI’L REV. (July 30, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/
human-exceptionalism/384136/biological-colonialism-surrogacy-fraudsters-wesley-j-smith (in a
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While the analogy to sex work is often made, 28 it is not necessary to
compare surrogacy to sex work 29 to see the potential ramifications of
offering thousands of dollars for approximately ten months of work, in a
setting where there is very little competition (and none from men) for
women of reproductive age. Especially for lower wage earners, who are
unlikely to earn such a significant amount of money in such a relatively
short time, the offer could be very financially attractive.
1. The Role of Race and Class in Reproduction in the United States
However, viewing surrogacy as a simple monetary transaction
obscures the long and brutal history of state and state-sanctioned control
of the reproduction, childbearing, and parenting of women of color,
especially African American and Native American women, whose
particular histories of enslavement and colonization in the United States
continue to inform law and policy. 30 As Dorothy Roberts has explained
in Killing the Black Body, enslaved African and African American
women’s reproductive capacity was severed from their motherhood
during slavery, and rape by white men was used to subjugate women and
enslave their children. 31 Anita Allen argues that, effectively, enslaved
women were surrogate mothers for the white men who owned them,
bearing children to whom they had no parental rights who were also the
property of the slave owner. 32 The ongoing subjection of African
American women—especially poor women—to coercive reproductive
policies in the welfare programs and through the drug war remains a
reality. 33 African American women are disproportionately poor, 34
commentary on surrogacy arrangements between United States intended parents and women acting
as surrogates in Mexico and India, exclaiming, “[b]abies are being purchased like lumber at Home
Depot!”).
28. See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE AND POLITICS DRIVE THE
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 82–83 (2006) (explaining that surrogacy is frequently likened to sex
work).
29. It is beyond the scope of this paper to do justice to the complexity of the analogy. Moreover,
as an advocate for the decriminalization of sex work, and consistent with my stance of recognizing
the humanity of people who engage in surrogacy contracts, I am not willing to make the comparison
in the service of demonizing either practice.
30. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 282–83; ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL
VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE (2005) (recounting the sexual and reproductive
violence perpetrated by European colonizers of the Native American land and peoples of the current
United States, including rape, sexual abuse, and the forced separation of children from their families
and cultures).
31. ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 22–55.
32. Allen, supra note 24, at 18–19.
33. ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 150–245.
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disproportionately incarcerated, 35 and disproportionately targets of
welfare laws 36 and judicial interventions 37 that coerce them to have
fewer children or use potentially dangerous contraception.
Women of color incarcerated in California have recently been the
targets of coercive sterilization, 38 a practice that echoes the forced and
coerced sterilizations of women on welfare and Native American women
receiving health care through the Indian Health Services in the 1960s
and early 1970s. 39 To this day, women in poverty—but especially poor
women of color—are overrepresented in the child welfare system,
meaning that they are more likely to have their parenting, let alone their
reproduction, interrogated, monitored, and too often disrupted by the

34. Alexandra Cawthorne, The Straight Facts on Women and Poverty, FOR AM. PROGRESS 1
(Oct.
2008),
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2008/10/pdf/
women_poverty.pdf (“Over a quarter of black women and nearly a quarter of Latina women are
poor. Black and Latina women are at least twice as likely as white women to be living in poverty.”).
35. PAUL GUERINO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS
IN 2010, at 7 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf (noting that in 2010,
African American women were incarcerated at three times the rate of white women).
36. Sanford F. Schram, Race and State Welfare Reform Choices: A Cause for Concern, in FROM
POVERTY TO PUNISHMENT: HOW WELFARE REFORM PUNISHES THE POOR 89, 92–100 (Gary
Delgado ed., 2002) (explaining that states with higher percentages of African American and Latina
recipients are more likely to enact “get-tough” welfare policies, such as family caps, that target the
procreation of mothers receiving welfare by limiting the number of children for whom a recipient
can receive additional monthly funds); see also Gary Delgado & Rebecca Gordon, From Social
Contract to Social Control: Welfare Policy and Race, in FROM POVERTY TO PUNISHMENT: HOW
WELFARE REFORM PUNISHES THE POOR 25, 45–57 (describing the racist origins of welfare reform
rhetoric and noting the sexual and reproductive control policies in the welfare program); ROBERTS,
supra note 24, at 203–45 (also exploring the racist origins of welfare reform rhetoric, and linking
that rhetoric and sexual and reproductive control policies to the demonization of black motherhood
from the time of slavery and throughout United States history).
37. ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 151–71 (describing, among other interventions, a case in which a
judge gave a woman the “choice” between a longer prison sentence and probation on condition that
she be implanted with Norplant, a long-acting contraceptive that requires medical removal); Lynn
M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United
States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 299, 300–01 (2013) (documenting hundreds of arrests, prosecutions, forced cesarean
sections, and other forced medical interventions directed at pregnant women during the period
studied, and finding that “low-income women and women of color, especially African American
women, are overrepresented among those who have been arrested or subjected to equivalent
deprivations of liberty”).
38. See Sara Ainsworth & Rachel Roth, “If They Hand You a Paper, You Sign It”: A Call to End
the Sterilization of Women in Prison, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (forthcoming December 2014);
Robin Levi et al., Prisons as a Tool of Reproductive Oppression, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 309 (2009);
Corey G. Johnson, Female Inmates Sterilized in California Prisons Without Approval, CENTER FOR
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (July 7, 2013), http://cironline.org/reports/female-inmates-sterilizedcalifornia-prisons-without-approval-4917.
39. ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 89–96; see also Ainsworth & Roth, supra note 38.
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state. 40
Given the deep structural inequities that remain entrenched in United
States law and society, why should we allow and spend resources
regulating arrangements that increase the reproductive capacity of
affluent, most often white, 41 people when the reproductive health,
equality, and self-determination of people of color remains at risk? We
are not so far from a time when the bodies of women of color could be
legally owned, and the United States still grapples with structural
vestiges of that history, as well as the ongoing trafficking of people for
labor and sex work both within and to this country. 42 While it appears
that surrogates in the United States have not typically been low-income
women of color or women who consider themselves coerced into the
practice, concerns of exploitation are present in another surrogacy
practice of intended parents in the United States: reproductive tourism,
or contracting with a woman from another country to act as a surrogate.
2. Reproductive Tourism and the India Experience
The advent of a lucrative surrogacy industry in India 43 has been
extensively described in recent years—and with particular concern from
feminists in India and around the world. 44 International surrogacy
40. See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE
(2002).
41. There is little recent empirical research that focuses on the demographics of intended parents,
as opposed to women acting as surrogates. A 1988 federal resource indicated that ninety-five
percent of intended parents were white. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,
INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 269 (1988). Given the demographics of race and
affluence in the United States, and the expense of surrogacy arrangements, it is a safe assumption (if
only an assumption) that at this time, the majority of intended parents in the United States are white.
42. See, e.g., HEATHER J. CLAWSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HUMAN
TRAFFICKING INTO AND WITHIN THE UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 4 (2009),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/humantrafficking/litrev/index.pdf (estimating that 600,000 to
800,000 people are trafficked into the United States annually, and an additional 200,000 to 400,000
people are victims of domestic trafficking).
43. Lucrative, that is, for the Indian surrogacy industry, which brought in an estimated 20 billion
dollars in 2011. Preeti Nayak, The Three Ms of Commercial Surrogacy in India: Mother, Money,
and Medical Market, in GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONAL SURROGACY IN INDIA:
OUTSOURCING LIFE 1, 2 (Sayantani DasGupta & Shamita Das Dasgupta eds., 2014).
44. Id.; see also FRANCE WINDDANCE TWINE, OUTSOURCING THE WOMB: RACE, CLASS, AND
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY IN A GLOBAL MARKET (2011); Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting
the Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research on Surrogate Mothers, 26 CAN. J.
FAM. L. 13, 82–85 (2010); Sreeja Jaiswal, Commercial Surrogacy in India: An Ethical Assessment
of Existing Legal Scenario from the Perspective of Women’s Autonomy and Reproductive Rights, 16
GENDER TECH. & DEV. 1 (2012); Amrita Pande, Commercial Surrogacy in India: Manufacturing a
Perfect Mother-Worker, 35 J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 969 (2010); Birthing a Market, supra
note 26, at 7.
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arrangements are popular in part because many countries (and states in
the United States) ban or strictly limit commercial surrogacy within their
borders. 45 Intended parents seeking to have a child through a surrogacy
arrangement go to the states or countries where surrogacy is permitted
or, in the case of India, expressly sanctioned by law. 46
Women acting as surrogates in India are typically paid significantly
less than women acting as surrogates in the United States, 47 but there are
additional reasons beyond cost that attract intended parents to surrogacy
arrangements there. First, the practice is not underground; India
expressly legalized commercial surrogacy in 2002. 48 In addition,
medical care in India is of comparable quality to the intended parents’
home countries, and, as will be explained more thoroughly below,
intended parents appreciate the ability to closely monitor the women
acting as surrogates. 49 And, until recently, gay couples and single adults
could enter into surrogacy arrangements there. 50
Feminists in India, as well as in the United States and in other
countries, have expressed deep concern about the practice of
reproductive tourism. Before considering those concerns, it is important
to point out that Western feminist critique (as opposed to that of
feminists in India) must recognize its cultural distance when critiquing
the experiences and practices that affect women in India. As Alison
Bailey points out, Western feminists have frequently presented Western
ideas as “liberating” and viewed women in the Global South as
“backward, poor, illiterate, culturally oppressed, and in need of
rescue.” 51 It is important to recognize that limitation when considering
45. See Nicolas, supra note 17, at 1239−45.
46. Scott Carney, Inside India’s Rent-a-Womb Business, MOTHER JONES (Mar./Apr. 2010),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/02/surrogacy-tourism-india-nayna-patel.
47. See Indian Surrogacy Helps Lift Some Poor, But Raises Ethical Issues, PBS NEWSHOUR
(Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/globalhealth-july-dec11-surrogates_08-05/ (the
entire costs of a surrogacy arrangement in India are about $10,000 to $15,000, and the woman
acting as a surrogate receives approximately $7,000); Deborah L. Cohen, Surrogate Pregnancies on
Rise Despite Cost Hurdles, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=
USBRE92H11Q20130318 (costs of surrogacy in the United States range from $75,000 to $120,000
or more for the entire process; in the example cited in this article, the surrogates themselves
received from $30,000 to $35,000).
48. Carney, supra note 46.
49. Birthing a Market, supra note 26, at 7.
50. See, e.g., Nilanjana Bhowmick, Why People Are So Angry About India’s New Surrogacy
Rules, TIME (Feb. 15, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/02/15/why-people-are-angry-about-indiasnew-surrogacy-laws/.
51. Alison Bailey, Reconceiving Surrogacy: Toward a Reproductive Justice Account of Indian
Surrogacy, 26 HYPATIA 715, 717 (2011).
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critique from feminists outside India.
What has concerned feminists (and ethicists) so greatly about
reproductive tourism is the huge disparity in wealth between the women
acting as surrogates and the intended parents, as well as the distance
between them that necessitates an arms-length transaction and third
party involvement. 52 All of these factors tend to diminish the power of
the women acting as surrogates relative to the power of the intended
parents. The practice around surrogacy in India is of concern as well.
The Ashanksa Fertility Clinic in the state of Gujarat has gained fame
(and notoriety) for taking a significant amount of the money in the
transaction, for requiring the women acting as surrogates to spend their
pregnancies in a compound away from their families where their diet
and activities are monitored, and for encouraging unnecessary cesarean
births. 53 And yet, women who act as surrogates in India frequently earn
several times what they could otherwise earn in a year, enabling them to
purchase homes or send their own children to school. 54 In short, India’s
situation presents precisely the dilemma that so vexes feminists in the
United States—the risk that women’s bodies and lives will be
additionally subject to state and private control when economic need
leads them to employ their reproductive capacity as wage labor.
3. Pregnant Women and State Control
There is a real risk that women engaged in surrogacy arrangements in
the United States, as well as in other countries, will be subject to
intrusive, even punitive constraints on their liberty. The experiences of
some women acting as surrogates in India is an example. In the United
States, where feminist movement gains in recent decades have wrought
significant change for women, the rhetoric of choice elides the fact that
for many pregnant women, not only is access to abortion difficult or
impossible, but drug policy and the rise of mass incarceration have
together created a two-tiered system of reproductive access and
control. 55

52. See, e.g., Amrita Pande, Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India: Gifts for Global
Sisters?, 23 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 618, 623 (2011) (“As transactions in reproductive services
cross borders, the differences between the buyers and sellers, whether based on race, class or
nationality, become glaring. Unarguably, transnational commercial surrogacy in India is shaped by
profound inequities in power.”); see also Birthing a Market, supra note 26, at 25–26, 103.
53. See PBS NEWSHOUR, supra note 47.
54. Id.
55. See generally Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 37; see also JEANNE FLAVIN, OUR BODIES, OUR
CRIMES: THE POLICING OF WOMEN’S REPRODUCTION IN AMERICA 20–21, 105–21 (2009);
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As Lynn Paltrow and Jeanne Flavin have documented, pregnant
women throughout the United States are subject to arrest, prosecution,
conviction, or other judicial interventions. 56 Pregnant women have been
and are currently being prosecuted or subjected to additional charges,
longer jail sentences, and higher bail because of drug use (including use
of prescribed medication), mental health problems, or abortion. 57
Newborn children have been taken from their mothers by child welfare
systems because their mothers took a drug during pregnancy—even in
the absence of any demonstrated harm to the newborn. 58 Other pregnant
women have been ordered by courts and forced by their physicians to
have cesarean surgeries. 59 Poor women of color are more likely to be
targeted for such interventions and punishment. 60
These arrests and interventions reflect what concerns feminists about
surrogacy, too. When courts enforce surrogacy contracts, such contracts
present yet another opportunity for state-sanctioned control of pregnant
women. Indeed, surrogacy contracts in states that allow the practice may
be used to limit and control the decisions, actions, and self-determination
of pregnant women. For example, Illinois’ surrogacy law permits the
enforcement of surrogacy contracts that include terms that restrain the
pregnant woman’s decision-making and autonomy, including the
ROBERTS, supra note 24 at 150–94.
56. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 37, at 312.
57. Id.; see also McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming, in
part, district court’s decision enjoining Idaho’s prosecution of woman who self-induced an abortion
with medication she obtained online); Nina Liss-Schultz, First Woman Arrested Under Tennessee
Pregnancy Criminalization Law, for a Drug Not Covered Under the Law, RH REALITY CHECK
(July 10, 2014), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/07/10/first-woman-arrested-tennesseepregnancy-criminalization-law-drug-covered-law/ (reporting the first arrest of a woman for assault
in relation to a positive toxicology screen at the birth of her child, pursuant to Tennessee’s highly
controversial law amending its fetal homicide statute to allow the prosecution of pregnant women
and new mothers).
58. See, e.g., Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 37, at 318–19 (explaining that even a mistaken belief
that a pregnant woman has used drugs has led to state interventions against pregnant women and
new mothers); Kristen Gwynne, Victory for Woman Whose Newborn Baby Was Taken Away After
Poppyseed Bagel Caused Positive Drug Test, ALTERNET (July 3, 2013), http://www.alternet.org/
drugs/new-mother-who-failed-drug-test-due-poppy-seed-bagel-gets-baby-back.
59. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1261–64 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reversing lower court’s grant
of court order forcing Angela Carder (A.C.), a pregnant cancer patient, to have a cesarean section
without her consent; tragically, the cesarean section led to the death of both Ms. Carder and her
baby).
60. See Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 37, at 311–12; AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS &
GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 321: MATERNAL DECISION MAKING, ETHICS, AND THE
LAW 8–9 (2005), http://www.acog.org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions/Committee%20on%
20Ethics/co321.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20140913T2016315945 (citing studies that found that the vast
majority of court-ordered cesarean sections were directed at poor women of color).
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woman’s
agreement to abstain from any activities that the intended parent
or parents or the physician reasonably believes to be harmful to
the pregnancy and future health of the child, including, without
limitation, smoking, drinking alcohol, using nonprescribed
drugs, using prescription drugs not authorized by a physician
aware of the gestational surrogate’s pregnancy, exposure to
radiation, or any other activities proscribed by a health care
provider. 61
Such a provision was also in place in the contract at issue in the wellknown surrogacy decision in Johnson v. Calvert, 62 but because that
contract contained a contradictory provision regarding abortion, the
California Supreme Court did not address the question of whether that
provision could be enforced. 63
Some intended parents who make surrogacy arrangements have
expectations that reinforce the concern that pregnant women’s liberty is
at risk. As Sharmila Rudrappa explains, a consistent theme among
intended parents contracting with Indian women as surrogates is the
desire of the intended parents to regulate the life of the pregnant
woman. 64 One couple working with a United States woman acting as
surrogate described being distressed that the pregnant woman was taking
night classes, and secretly relieved when her physician recommended
bed rest for the remainder of the pregnancy. 65 Other intended parents
who had made surrogacy arrangements with women in India described
appreciating the more controlled environment, believing that the women
were less likely to do something that endangered the pregnancy. 66 While
it is understandable that intended parents want to ensure prenatal health,
it is another thing entirely to judicially enforce contracts that constrain
the liberty of pregnant women to make decisions about their own health
and lives.
61. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 25-(d)2 (West 2012 & Supp. 2013) (emphasis added).
62. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
63. Id. at 784 (“We note that although at one point the contract purports to give Mark and
Crispina the sole right to determine whether to abort the pregnancy, at another point it
acknowledges: ‘All parties understand that a pregnant woman has the absolute right to abort or not
abort any fetus she is carrying. Any promise to the contrary is unenforceable.’ We therefore need
not determine the validity of a surrogacy contract purporting to deprive the gestator of her freedom
to terminate the pregnancy.”).
64. Sharmila Rudrappa, Mother India: Outsourcing Labor to Indian Surrogate Mothers, in
GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONAL SURROGACY IN India, supra note 43, at 125, 135–40.
65. Id. at 138.
66. Id. at 137–38.
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Under such a scheme, the civil rights and self-determination of
pregnant women would become secondary to the concerns of the
intended parents—and subject to state control and intervention through
judicial enforcement. And when pregnant women’s lives can be
monitored and controlled, all women’s status as rights bearers and
constitutional persons is at risk. So a challenge for feminists in
considering surrogacy is how to protect the rights of pregnant women
from coercive interventions. This challenge is compounded for feminists
because surrogacy arrangements have also become an important route to
parenthood for gay (but not necessarily lesbian) couples, whose own
rights to self-determination and privacy have only recently been
vindicated in some contexts and jurisdictions. 67
B. Rights to Family Formation and the Question of Genetic Ties
Whatever challenges surrogacy poses for feminist concerns regarding
women’s self-determination and freedom from exploitation, it also has
increasingly been a process by which gay male couples, in particular,
have children and create families.68 A key feminist project has been to
free people in society from constricting gender roles. 69 Ensuring equal
family recognition for lesbian and gay families is part of that project,
although lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer activists,
including people of color, have also argued either that the attainment of
marriage equality and other family rights are not sufficient or that they
are the wrong goal. 70 While gay couples increasingly turn to women
acting as surrogates to form families, legalizing surrogacy has not been a
67. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, __U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down Defense
of Marriage Act’s marriage definition as a liberty deprivation); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (holding that laws that criminalize sexual intimacy between consenting adults of the same
sex violate the right to privacy).
68. See generally Nicolas, supra note 17 (describing his experience of having a child with his
husband through a surrogacy arrangement); Miriam Pérez, Surrogacy: The Next Frontier for
Reproductive Justice, RH REALITY CHECK (Feb. 23, 2010), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2010/
02/23/surrogacy-next-frontier-reproductive-justice/.
69. See Martha A. Fineman, Gender and Law: Feminist Legal Theory’s Role in New Legal
Realism, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 405, 407 (2005) (“Feminism, as a discipline, is focused on the
significance of gender and the societal inequalities resulting from values and assumptions based on
gender. As a group, feminists are concerned with the implications of historic and contemporary
exploitation of women within society, seeking the empowerment of women and the transformation
of institutions dominated by men.”).
70. See, e.g., DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE 33 (2011) (critiquing the emphasis on marriage
equality and hate crimes laws, arguing that “legal equality goals threaten to provide nothing more
than adjustments to the window-dressing of neoliberal violence that ultimately disserve and further
marginalize the most vulnerable trans populations”).
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major priority for LGBTQ rights activists either.71
But it is a mistake to assume that surrogacy laws have not
contemplated LGBTQ families. In fact, some states’ surrogacy laws
have been yet another locus for legally enshrining discrimination against
LGBTQ people. In Florida, for example, surrogacy provisions explicitly
prohibit anyone who is not “legally married” from engaging in
surrogacy; the state, as of this writing, bans marriage between partners
of the same sex. 72 For feminists who seek to undermine notions of
marriage that cabin women’s roles, to ensure equality and legal
recognition for lesbian and gay families, and to challenge any law that
expressly discriminates on the basis of sexuality, surrogacy laws present
the difficult challenge of balancing potentially competing human needs
and concerns. This challenge is compounded by the fact that most gay
(and straight) couples who engage in surrogacy often support these
arrangements by linking them to their desire to have “their own”—i.e., a
genetically related—child. 73
The question of whether genetic relationship makes a parent is
another difficult wrinkle of surrogacy. Perhaps it is the most difficult
challenge, as it is one of the driving forces behind the practice in the first
place. It goes without saying that there are other ways to become a
parent, and genetic relationship is not the only reason people engage in
surrogacy arrangements. As noted above, homophobia has led to
discriminatory adoption laws and practices in several states, preventing
gay people—and in some states any single person—from adopting a
child, leaving surrogacy as one of a very limited number of options. But
intended parents consistently frame their desire for a genetically related
child as their reason for entering into a surrogacy arrangement; this is
not surprising because, as sociologist Olga van den Akker explains,
“current law and most cultural values define parenthood and the family
in biological terms.” 74 But should this desire for genetically related
71. One exception is the Washington State legislative experience, where a gay legislator led the
efforts to repeal the state ban on compensated surrogacy. See Rosbach, supra note 8.
72. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1) (West 2010 & Supp. 2013). However, the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in United States. v. Windsor calls into question the constitutionality of
laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694–96.
73. See, e.g., Olga van den Akker, The Importance of a Genetic Link in Mothers Commissioning
a Surrogate Baby in the UK, 15 HUM. REPROD. 1849, 1853 (2000).
74. Olga van den Akker, Psychosocial Aspects of Surrogate Motherhood, 13 HUM. REPROD.
UPDATE 53, 54 (2007). I must point out that people who want to and can conceive through sexual
intercourse get to make the decision to have genetically related children without scrutiny (myself
included). Rarely are they criticized for bringing a baby into the world when there are children
available for adoption, but that critique is routinely leveled at people who have children with the
help of a woman acting as surrogate. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 286 (suggesting, in the
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children be legally supported from a feminist perspective?
In Parentage of L.B., 75 Legal Voice (then the Northwest Women’s
Law Center) argued that a person who parents a child is the child’s
parent, and should be recognized as such in law. 76 In that case, the
Washington State Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of “de
facto parenthood,” allowing the non-biological mother of a child to
defend her parental rights. 77 Countless grandmothers, grandfathers,
aunts, uncles, siblings, friends, and neighbors in the United States care
for children as kinship caregivers, often without formal legal
recognition. 78 To insist that genetics makes a parent undermines the
rights of people to legal and social recognition of their families. 79
Moreover, the Uniform Parentage Act, the model law on legal parentage
adopted, in some form, by most states, expressly acknowledges that a
person who did not contribute a gamete to create a child may
nonetheless be a legal parent, with all the rights and responsibilities that
status entails. 80
Surrogacy laws in many states, however, place a strong emphasis on
genetic ties. In Illinois, for example—a state with what is arguably one
of the most progressive surrogacy laws to date—LGBTQ families are
not excluded from participation, but only gestational surrogacy is within
context of exploring the potential racist and eugenic implications of assisted reproductive
technologies, “[i]t would be hypocritical to condemn people who resort to new reproductive
technologies for having the same desires for their children as more conventional parents, whose
decisions are not so scrutinized”). There are, of course, people who believe that it is
environmentally irresponsible and selfish for anyone to have children, but that is a different critique.
75. In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wash. 2d 679, 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005).
76. Id. at 702–09, 173–77.
77. Id. at 712, 179; see also S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(recognizing a non-adoptive, non-biological mother as a legal parent of the children she held out as
her own, and noting that “numerous states have recognized the parental rights of same-sex coparents who do not have a biological or adoptive relationship with a child”).
78. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., KINSHIP CAREGIVERS AND THE CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM, (2010), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/f_kinshi/f_kinshi.pdf
(contrasting informal and formally recognized kinship caregivers); Laura Weinrib, Kinship Care
Reform: A Proposal for Consent Legislation in Massachusetts, 87 MASS. L. REV. 23, 24 (2002)
(describing the significance of informal kinship caregivers in Massachusetts and the legal
impediments they face when caring for children outside the formal foster care system).
79. See, e.g., Neil S. v. Mary L., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that
biology is not determinative of parentage, and noting that California courts over the last three
decades have placed increasing importance on the child’s social relationship with a prospective
parent).
80. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT. §§ 204(a)(5), 702 (amended 2002) (parentage may be established
by holding a child out as one’s own for the first two years of the child’s life, regardless of biological
relationship, and people who donate eggs or sperm for assisted reproduction are excluded as parents
of a resulting child).
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the law’s reach. 81 Presumably, traditional surrogacy arrangements—
where the woman acting as surrogate is also the biological parent of the
child she carries—would fall outside the law’s protections and would
end up, if contested, in family court proceedings where the law does not
well fit the circumstances. 82 The preference for gestational surrogacy
enforces the social perception of the importance of having (or, in the
case of the pregnant woman, not having) a genetic tie to one’s child.
This social perception is inaccurate, though, at least far as Western
women acting as surrogates are concerned: women who engage in
traditional surrogacy arrangements generally report the same levels of
comfort in going through with the surrogacy and relinquishing the baby
to the intended parents as do gestational surrogates. 83
Moreover, if the preferred feminist claim is that genetics does not
make a parent, that has ramifications for whether the law should allow or
prohibit “traditional” surrogacy—a surrogacy arrangement where the
woman acting as surrogate contributes her own ova to the conception of
the pregnancy. 84 Traditional surrogacy (the process used in the Baby M
case, for example) is less common now—in part because it is not legally
supported in some of the jurisdictions that allow surrogacy contracts. 85
However, it may carry fewer health risks for the woman acting as
surrogates because no in vitro process is typically involved. 86 Moreover,
women report that traditional surrogacy does not change their ability to
go through with the contract and give the baby to the intended parents.87
From this perspective, traditional surrogacy may be preferable for

81. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 1 (West 2012).
82. See, e.g., Barbara Stark, Transnational Surrogacy and International Human Rights Law, 18
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 369, 373 (2012) (“Pre-existing family law is inadequate to address
surrogacy, in part because of the multiple parents . . . .”).
83. See, e.g., Olga van den Akker, Psychological Trait and State Characteristics, Social Support
and Attitudes to the Surrogate Pregnancy and Baby, 22 HUM. REPROD. 2287, 2293–94 (2007);
Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 4, at 1261 (while arguing that gestational surrogacy is preferable because
the women acting as gestational surrogates place importance on the lack of genetic tie as a way to
distance themselves from their pregnancies and avoid bonding with the baby after birth, noting that
“[t]oo much should not be made of the difference between gestational and traditional surrogacy as
traditional surrogates also attest to being able to detach from the babies by focusing on the
importance of social parenthood.”). This comfort was also reflected in my discussions with women
acting as surrogates in Idaho and Oregon.
84. See Julie Shapiro, For Feminists Considering Surrogacy, Is Compensation Really the Key
Question?, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1345, 1346 n.7 (2014).
85. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 5.
86. Dominique Ladomato, Protecting Traditional Surrogacy Contracting Through Fee Payment
Regulation, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 245, 248 n.22 (2012).
87. See van den Akker, supra note 83.
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women acting as surrogates—both to advance the principle that genetics
does not make a parent, and to support women’s health. 88
C. Health, Access to Health Care, and Reproductive Technologies
Viewed through a health lens, surrogacy raises additional challenges
for creating a progressive, equitable framework for the practice. Assisted
reproduction in the United States is a highly medicalized affair. This is,
in part, a necessity—when undergoing ovum extraction, for example, a
woman must take medication that stimulates the production of ova, and
then have the resulting eggs extracted by a physician through an invasive
procedure. 89 Insemination with donor sperm, too, may take place in the
medical setting, although people do not always require physician
assistance to successfully conceive through insemination. 90 However,
some states’ parentage laws require physician involvement to exclude a
sperm donor as a legal parent. 91 In any event, although people certainly
assist each other in conceiving children outside of the medical context,
the health care system is the primary provider of assisted reproduction in
the United States. 92
This health care system remains profoundly inequitable, despite the
gains of the Affordable Care Act. For many people struggling to
conceive children, the options are extremely limited. This is particularly
true in the context of assisted reproduction. Most people in the United
States lack insurance coverage for infertility treatments, 93 and it is
unclear whether the Affordable Care Act (ACA) will improve or further
88. See Shapiro, supra note 84.
89. See Fact Sheet: Egg Donation, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED. (2012),
http://www.reproductivefacts.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/Resources/Patient_Resources/Fact
_Sheets_and_Info_Booklets/Egg%20donation%20FINAL%204-23-12.pdf.
90. I found no scientific studies on success rates of at-home artificial insemination, but there are a
number of written and online materials describing how to perform the various methods of at-home
insemination. See, e.g., CYNTHIA FEAKANS & DEB COHAN, BAY AREA PERINATAL AIDS CTR.,
HOME INSEMINATION: A SAFER WAY TO GET PREGNANT (2011), available at http://hiv.ucsf.edu/
care/perinatal/forpatients/HomeinseminationforHIVfemalediscordantcouple.pdf (advocating for
home insemination, and explaining how it’s done, for HIV positive women who want to get
pregnant without exposing an HIV negative male partner to unsafe sex).
91. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17–44 (West 2013).
92. See, e.g., AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: A
GUIDE FOR PATIENTS (2011), available at https://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/
Resources/Patient_Resources/Fact_Sheets_and_Info_Booklets/ART.pdf (describing the complex—
and highly medical—procedures of assisted reproductive technologies, including in vitro
fertilization).
93. Kate Devine et al., The Affordable Care Act: Early Implications for Fertility Medicine, 101
FERTILITY & STERILITY 1224, 1224 (2014).
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limit access to assisted reproductive medicine. 94 The cost of surrogacy—
from $60,000 to upwards of $120,000 95—is out of reach for most people
in the United States, rendering surrogacy a reproductive option only for
people with means. 96
But when considering whether to improve access to this procreative
option, the considerably different rates of premature birth, maternal
health complications, stillbirth, and other pregnancy outcomes for
women of color 97 should give feminists pause. Women’s rights activists
have worked hard to improve health care access, supported universal
healthcare, continued to work to use the ACA to expand access to
women’s health, 98 undertaken a campaign to repeal federal and state
abortion funding restrictions, 99 and struggled to make contraception
available to and safe for women and girls. Health care disparities remain,
however, a critical concern for low-income communities and people of
color. 100 In one of the most glaring and unjust examples, immigrants’
94. Id.
95. See Mike Anderson, Surrogacy Financing: How to Afford that $60K Price Tag, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Oct. 23, 2013), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-money/2013/10/21/
surrogacy-financing-how-to-afford-that-60k-price-tag.
96. This is true of infertility services generally; as Pamela Bridgewater explains, African
American and Latina women are less likely to be consumers of assisted reproductive technologies,
“as are poor people and people with less than a high school education.” Pamela D. Bridgewater,
Reconstructing Rationality: Towards a Critical Economic Theory of Reproduction, 56 EMORY L.J.
1215, 1225 (2007). However, prominent African American women have had children through
surrogacy arrangements, most recently professor and MSNBC host Melissa Harris-Perry. Janna
Zinzi, How Melissa Harris-Perry Is Sparking a National Conversation About Fertility and Family,
RH REALITY CHECK (Mar. 18, 2014), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/03/18/melissa-harrisperry-sparking-national-conversation-fertility-family/.
97. See AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY DELIVERY: THE MATERNAL HEALTH CRISIS IN THE USA, ONEYEAR UPDATE 3, 19 (2011), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/
deadlydelivery.pdf [hereinafter DEADLY DELIVERY] (noting maternal mortality rate for African
American women in the United States is three to four times that of white women at comparable
socio-economic levels); INST. OF MED., REPORT BRIEF: PRETERM BIRTH, CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
AND PREVENTION, (2006), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2006/
Preterm-Birth-Causes-Consequences-and-Prevention/Preterm%20Birth%202006%20Report%
20Brief.pdf (noting there are “very troubling and persistent” disparities in pre-term birth,
particularly for African American and Latina women).
98. See, e.g., RAISING WOMEN’S VOICES FOR THE HEALTH CARE WE NEED,
http://www.raisingwomensvoices.net/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2014). That work was undermined, but
not ended, by the Supreme Court’s decision holding that closely-held for-profit companies have
religious rights under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act that permit them to refuse to
follow the minimum essential coverage mandate that includes birth control. See Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., __ U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
99. See ALL ABOVE ALL, http://allaboveall.org/home/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2014).
100. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CDC Health Disparities and
Inequalities Report — United States, 2013 (2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/
other/su6203.pdf.
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access to public medical assistance programs and the health care
exchanges created by the ACA is limited because of a five-year bar on
access to health benefits for lawful permanent residents, and the flat
denial of health care to undocumented people. 101
Health care disparities are not limited, however, to people who lack
health insurance. African American and Native American women, for
example, regardless of education or affluence, have significantly worse
maternal and pregnancy outcomes than their white counterparts. 102 And
all women in the United States have worse outcomes than women in
forty-nine countries, including nearly every European country, Canada,
and several countries in Asia and the Middle East. 103 As Sheila
Capestany has persuasively argued, we should strive to achieve
European standards for all people in the United States, rather than rush
to reach “equity” among our rather low United States rates. 104 With
serious health care disparities and limited access to basic health care as a
backdrop, expanding access to surrogacy as the means of procreation is
unlikely to be a priority for women’s health advocates.
Another important question for women’s health advocates is whether
a woman acting as surrogate puts her health at risk in the process.
Pregnancy is always a risky endeavor. Short of death, pregnant women
face risks to their health such as gestational diabetes, high blood
pressure, childbirth complications and injuries, and more. 105 Even an
otherwise healthy and uneventful pregnancy may affect a woman’s longterm physical health. But in addition to those risks, women who act as
gestational surrogates typically go through an invasive in vitro medical
process. There are short-term risks to such procedures, and potentially
long-term risks as well, although those risks are not yet well understood
because of the relatively recent availability of in vitro fertilization
procedures. 106
In short, surrogacy arrangements implicate health care, as well as law
and policy. Questions of access, exclusion, and individual long-term

101. See Immigrants and the Affordable Care Act (ACA), NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CENTER (Jan.
2014), http://www.nilc.org/immigrantshcr.html.
102. See DEADLY DELIVERY, supra note 97, at 19.
103. Id. at 3.
104. Sheila Capestany, Remarks at Northwest Reproductive Justice Collaborative: Birthing and
Parenting in Prison: A Community Discussion (Dec. 8, 2009).
105. See Pregnancy Complications, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/pregcomplications.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2014).
106. Stark, supra note 82.
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reproductive health inform the feminist understanding of surrogacy, and
add to the complexity of the issue, particularly in a society where health
care is not recognized as a human right and access to reproductive health
care is, for many, threatened or out of reach.
D. Bringing More Voices to the Debate: People with Disabilities
Like people who lack access to health care in the United States,
people with disabilities, too, are affected by the surrogacy discussion but
are rarely at the forefront of the debate. Questions of assisted
reproductive technology deeply affect people with disabilities, as their
rights to procreate, 107 to participate in surrogacy, 108 and to be valued as
full human beings 109 have long been questioned. Discussions about
surrogacy typically do not envision people with disabilities as either
intended parents or as women acting as surrogates, but as fetuses or
newborn babies whose existence will challenge the parameters of the
surrogacy agreement. 110 The primary question seems to be, what should
happen when a pregnant woman acting as a surrogate receives a prenatal
diagnosis that the fetus has a medical condition that may cause it to be
107. For decades in the United States, people with disabilities, poor people, and people of color
(especially welfare recipients and Native American women) were subjected to forced sterilization
under eugenics policy. Although those policies have been repudiated, see Ainsworth & Roth, supra
note 38, people with disabilities are still sterilized by court order. See, e.g., Conservatorship of
Angela D., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). On a different note, others argue that people
struggling with infertility are also suffering from a disability, and should have a right to assisted
reproductive technologies, including surrogacy. See Lindsey Coffey, A Rights-Based Claim to
Surrogacy: Article 23 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 20 MICH. ST.
INT’L. L. REV. 259, 291 (2012).
108. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(4), (b)(3) (West 2012) (requiring both women
acting as surrogates and intended parents to complete a mental health evaluation to establish
eligibility to participate in a legally recognized surrogacy contract). The law is silent, however, as to
what happens when a mental health evaluation indicates that a party may have a disability; perhaps
the assumption is that the market will resolve the issue, and that people will not contract with each
other under those circumstances. If that is so, that assessment is laden with the view that disability
renders people unfit for procreation.
109. Generations Ahead, A Reproductive Justice Analysis of Genetic Technologies: Report on a
National Convening of Women of Color and Indigenous Women 8–9 (2009), http://www.generationsahead.org/files-for-download/articles/GenAheadReport_ReproductiveJustice.pdf; Mia Mingus, Disabled
Women and Reproductive Justice, THE PRO-CHOICE PUBLIC EDUCATION PROJECT,
http://protectchoice.org/article.php?id=140 (last visited Aug. 13, 2014) (noting that in United States
culture, disability is frequently “feared, hated, and typically regarded as a condition that reduces the
value of disabled people”).
110. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cohen, Surrogate Offered $10,000 to Abort Baby, CNN HEALTH (Mar.
6, 2013, 2:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/04/health/surrogacy-helly-legal-battle/; Hilary
Whiteman, Surrogate Mom Vows to Take Care of Ill Twin “Abandoned” by Parents, CNN WORLD
(Aug. 7, 2014, 12:29 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/04/world/asia/thailand-australia-surrogacy/.
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born with a disability?
Other reproductive technologies, such as pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis, or PGD, allow prospective parents and their health care
providers to control for certain genetic attributes in fertilized embryos
before they are implanted in a woman’s uterus. Ethicists and the media
have raised concerns regarding “designer babies,” suggesting the
possibility that parents could predetermine the height, eye color, and
other traits of their children. 111 But less frequently challenged is the
rhetoric that equates disability with reduced human value, rhetoric that is
pervasive in both surrogacy and abortion debates. 112
Feminists are also at fault for this dehumanizing treatment of
disability, particularly in the abortion context, as Alison Piepmeier
demonstrates in her article, Disability and What’s Wrong with Feminist
Framings of Reproduction. 113 After posting an article about having a
child with Down Syndrome on a New York Times blog, Ms. Piepmeier
received numerous comments from readers that equated giving birth to a
child with Down Syndrome (or any disability) with a “crime,” a “drain
on society,” and cruelty. 114 As Sujatha Jesudason and Julia Epstein
explain, abortion rights proponents “sometimes use disability to defend
access to abortion,” using rhetoric that inevitably equates disability with
tragedy. 115
Cases where the parties to a surrogate contract receive a prenatal
diagnosis of disability have led to conflict and media attention. 116 A host
of questions follow: should the intended parents be permitted to force
the woman acting as surrogate to have an abortion if a prenatal diagnosis
shows that the child may be born with a disability, such as Down
Syndrome? May the intended parents refuse to follow through with the
contract? Will the woman acting as surrogate become the legal parent if
the intended parents refuse to fulfill the contract, and if so, will the
intended parents be legally obligated to support the child financially?
The answers to these questions have, unfortunately, rarely been

111. See, e.g., Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World of Designer Babies, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
897 (2007).
112. See Sujatha Jesudason & Julia Epstein, Disability and Justice in Abortion Debates, CENTER
FOR WOMEN’S POLICY STUDIES (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.centerwomenpolicy.org/news/
newsletter/documents/REPRO_DisabilityandJusticeinAbortionDebates_JesudasonandEpstein.pdf.
113. Alison Piepmeier, Disability and What’s Wrong with Feminist Framings of Reproduction,
39 FEMINIST STUD. 159 (2013).
114. Id. at 160.
115. Jesudason & Epstein, supra note 112.
116. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 110.
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framed in a way that honors the humanity of people with disabilities. A
woman’s right to self-determination is a feminist imperative, but so
should be the dignity of people with disabilities, whose lives should not
be used as a rhetorical device or a justification for surrogacy policy.
Marsha Saxton’s claim about the abortion context is apropos here as
well: “[T]he great opportunity with this issue is to think and act and take
leadership in the place where feminism, disability rights, and human
liberation meet.” 117
II.

PEOPLE WHO PARTICIPATE IN SURROGACY
CONTRACTS: WHAT WE KNOW

In the decades since Baby M was decided, surrogacy arrangements in
the United States and between United States intended parents and
women in countries like India have become far more common. Much
more is known, now, about the demographics of the women who act as
surrogates and the people who become intended parents.118 As
scholars—most notably Canadian scholars Karen Busby and Delaney
Vun—have summarized this knowledge elsewhere, 119 this section will
briefly review the empirical information. While a detailed recounting is
not necessary here, an overview is included because feminist theory and
reproductive justice intentionally engage with people’s experiences to
inform a policy response.
A. Women Acting as Surrogates
Women acting as surrogates in the United States tend to be white, of
varying income, and define themselves as Christian. 120 Media in the
United States have reported that a significant number of women acting
as surrogates were married to men who are enlisted in the military, and
act as surrogates while their husbands are deployed overseas. 121 Women
acting as surrogates are frequently motivated by altruism; they have
117. Marsha Saxton, Disability Rights and Selective Abortion, in THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
READER 231, 238 (Nancy Ehrenreich ed., 2008).
118. There is also more information about the experiences of children born from surrogacy
arrangements, although the data is still fairly limited. Detailed attention to the concerns of children
born of surrogacy arrangements is beyond the scope of this Article. That is not to say that they are
not important.
119. See generally Busby & Vun, supra note 44.
120. Id. at 42–44.
121. See, e.g., Astrid Rodrigues and Jon Meyersohn, Military Wives Turn to Surrogacy: Labor of
Love or Financial Boost?, ABC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Parenting/
military-wives-surrogates-carrying-babies-love-money/story?id=11882687.
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consistently explained that they want to help someone who desperately
wants to have children, and that they view surrogacy as an opportunity
to do something meaningful with their lives. 122 Some women act as
surrogates for a close friend or relative, and in states like Washington,
where compensated surrogacy is banned, women nonetheless decide to
act as surrogates out of this sense of altruism. 123
In both United States and British studies, women acting as surrogates
indicate that they appreciated the emotional bond with the intended
parents—or were unhappy if that was lacking—and that they were
comfortable, even happy, giving the baby to the intended parents after
the birth. 124 They describe feeling like this pregnancy is akin to caring
for someone else’s child, unlike the bonding they experienced with
pregnancies with children they intended to keep. 125 This was true even
when they were genetically related to the children they carried; the
experience of Mary Beth Whitehead is not the norm. This is not a
surprising finding given that the vast majority of women who have had
abortions describe feelings of relief, rather than sorrow, after the
termination of their pregnancies. 126 These studies demonstrate that
women experience a pregnancy differently depending on their intentions
in relation to it.
Legal disputes—at least those that end up in court—between women
acting as surrogates and intended parents are apparently rare. 127
Although cases involving conflict receive significant media attention,
there are relatively few reported decisions involving custody and/or
contract disputes between parties to a surrogacy arrangement. 128 When
disputes do arise, they appear to happen when one party to the contract
feels the other has not met the expectations for emotional engagement—

122. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 53–56 (citing several studies of women in the United States
and the U.K. that concluded that money was rarely, if ever, the primary motivating factor for
women acting as surrogates).
123. In a lovely example, that apparently confounds expectations about race, a woman acted as
surrogate for her best friend, giving birth at home with her friend and their husbands, and
documented by a photographer. See Melanie Monroe Rosen, Best Friend Becomes Surrogate
Mother, PARENTING, http://www.parenting.com/gallery/surrogate-mother?page=14 (last visited
Sept. 15, 2014).
124. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 59–64; van den Akker, supra note 74, at 56.
125. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 68–74. Two women I spoke to in Oregon and Idaho, who
had each acted as surrogates more than once, also expressed this view.
126. See Corinne H. Rocca et al., Women’s Emotions One Week After Receiving or Being Denied
an Abortion in the United States, 49 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 122, 128 (2013).
127. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 72–73.
128. Id. at 36–38.
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in short, United States surrogacy arrangements tend not to be armslength, commercial-style transactions, but more complicated,
emotionally laden relationships. 129
B. Intended Parents
The significant expense of surrogacy for the intended parents suggests
that they may have more means than the women with whom they
contract as surrogates. 130 However, they are not necessarily wealthy. 131
Surrogacy will be more expensive for intended parents who live in a
state that does not legally recognize surrogacy contracts, so presumably
that prohibition acts as a barrier to people of lesser means utilizing
surrogacy arrangements. Economic incentives encourage some intended
parents to make surrogacy arrangements with women outside the United
States, in countries like India, Mexico, and, until recently, Ukraine,
where surrogacy is either explicitly legal or implicitly permitted. 132
Similarly, intended parents in other countries where surrogacy is
outlawed contract with women in the United States to act as surrogates
for them. 133
Intended parents tend to be straight couples who have been unable to
conceive children and for whom other fertility interventions have
failed. 134 Even celebrity women typically tell the press that they were
unable to conceive and turned to surrogacy for that reason, contrary to
assumptions that they used surrogacy to avoid changes to their
appearance. 135 Intended parents are also, increasingly, gay male couples
129. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 4, at 1232.
130. See, e.g., Melissa Dahl, More Couples, Like Jimmy Fallon and His Wife, Turning to
Surrogacy, TODAY (Aug. 9, 2013, 8:26 PM), http://www.today.com/health/more-couples-jimmyfallon-his-wife-turning-surrogacy-6C10885863 (noting the high cost of surrogacy that tends to
make it a privilege of the wealthy, while describing two stories involving intended parents who
borrowed significant amounts of money to pay for the surrogacy arrangement); see also Deborah L.
Cohen, Surrogate Pregnancies on Rise Despite Cost Hurdles, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2013, 5:40 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/18/us-parent-surrogate-idUSBRE92H11Q20130318.
131. Dahl, supra note 130.
132. Jennifer Kirby, These Two Americans Want Babies Through Indian Surrogates. It’s Not
Been Easy., NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115873/fertilitytourism-seeking-surrogacy-india-thailand-mexico.
133. Tamar Lewin, Coming to U.S. for Baby, and Womb to Carry It, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2014, at
A1.
134. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 79.
135. As Busby and Vun explain, “[s]ome are concerned that commercial surrogacy . . . allows
wealthy women to buy their way out of the burden of having to be pregnant.” Id. at 79. But the
research on surrogacy (and, in the case of celebrities, their reports), seems to belie that notion. See,
e.g., Summer Buesing, 18 Celebrities Who Used Surrogacy, THE RICHEST (June 7, 2014),
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who contribute one partner’s sperm and use a donor egg (a misnomer, as
egg donors are usually compensated in the United States) to create a prezygote, then contract with a woman acting as surrogate to carry the
pregnancy. 136 Single people may also engage in surrogacy
arrangements. 137
C. The Problem of Brokers
Although the Internet has allowed for the greater possibility that
intended parents and surrogates can meet and make arrangements
directly without third party involvement, many find each other through
brokers. 138 These third parties range from individuals such as former
surrogate mothers or lawyers to fertility clinics or stand-alone
agencies. 139 The use of third party agencies in this setting can be
analogized to adoption agencies, but a primary distinction is that
adoption agencies are highly regulated entities, whereas surrogacy
brokers operate almost universally free of oversight. 140
This lack of regulation has, unfortunately, allowed unscrupulous
brokers to victimize both intended parents and women acting as
surrogates. 141 In an infamous example, SurroGenesis, a surrogacy
agency in California, absconded with up to two million dollars from
intended parents, leaving numerous women in the middle of pregnancies
without health insurance, and the intended parents having lost all the
money they had believed would be used for the pregnant woman’s care
and fulfillment of their part of the surrogacy contract. 142
http://www.therichest.com/expensive-lifestyle/lifestyle/18-celebrities-who-used-surrogacy/.
136. See, e.g., Nicolas, supra note 17.
137. See, e.g., Lisa Flam, Yearning to Be Parent, Dad Is One of Few Single Men Who Turned to
Surrogacy, TODAY (July 26, 2013, 9:47 AM), http://www.today.com/parents/yearning-be-parentdad-one-few-single-men-who-turned-6C10744873.
138. It appears that third parties brokered surrogacy arrangements from the beginning. See Carol
Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J. L. & GENDER
67, 83–85 (2007) (telling the story of attorney Noel Keane, who brokered the arrangement between
Mary Beth Whitehead and the Sterns, and who became the “go-to guy” for people wanting to make
surrogacy arrangements in the northeast).
139. See Tamar Lewin, A Surrogacy Agency That Delivered Heartache, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2014, at A1.
140. California is the one exception. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7691 (West 2012 & Supp. 2013)
(regulating non-lawyer “surrogacy facilitators” by requiring funds intended for a surrogacy
agreement to be placed in escrow or in an attorney’s trust account, and distributed by either an
attorney or the escrow agent).
141. See Lewin, supra note 139.
142. Stephanie Saul, Would-Be Parents Find Surrogacy Agency Closed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
2009, at A14.
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The reality of people’s experiences with surrogacy, and the potential
for problems inherent in such a fraught context, calls for regulation to
protect the humanity of those involved. Regulation in this setting is
bound to be less helpful if it is ad hoc. Rather, a regulatory response to
compensated surrogacy should be based on a comprehensive, if
necessarily contingent, plan to further principles of gender equality,
social justice, and anti-subordination.
III. PROGRESSIVE, FEMINIST PRINCIPLES FOR REGULATING
SURROGACY
Because there is no one school of feminist thought, I take the liberty
of referring to the principles described below as “feminist,” knowing
that some will object to this framing. But a project that seeks to ensure
the anti-subordination of women surely fits within at least one school of
feminist thought. “Feminist” is, in this case, qualified by “progressive”
because a progressive vision includes both human rights to dignity and
self-determination, and a recognition that the state has a role in ensuring
the realization of those rights. 143 With that said, some will object that as
an economic exchange, compensated surrogacy is simply an expression
of capitalism and the reduction of all human endeavors, no matter how
sacred, to a market transaction.144 This is where the “pragmatic” feminist
approach comes in.
Pragmatic feminism is described by Mary Becker as the recognition
that no one “grand theory” can capture the possible manifestations of a
particular problem or the efficacy of proposed solutions. 145 Drawing
from Margaret Radin’s work, Becker suggests that surrogacy is too
complex to be resolved by feminist theories, such as dominance

143. See Al Yates & Anne Bartley, Progressive Thinking: A Synthesis of American Progressive
Values, Beliefs, and Positions, AM. VALUES PROJECT 1, 20 (2012), http://www.scribd.com/doc/
131793272/Progressive-Thinking.
144. See Barbara Katz Rothman, Reproductive Technology and the Commodification of Life, in
EMBRYOS, ETHICS, AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 95, 96 (Elaine Hoffman Baruch et al. eds., 1988);
Brandon McGinley, Why the Left Should Oppose Commercial Surrogacy, THE WEEK (Oct. 21,
2014), http://theweek.com/article/index/270139/why-the-left-should-oppose-commercial-surrogacy
(arguing that commercial surrogacy reduces women and babies to market commodities); Kathleen
Parker, Op-Ed., Kathleen Parker: The Exploitation of Surrogate Mothers, WASH. POST (May 24,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kathleen-parker-the-exploitation-of-surrogatemothers/2013/05/24/90bc159e-c4b0-11e2-8c3b-0b5e9247e8ca_story.html (describing an interview
with Kathleen Sloan, a feminist and board member of the National Organization for Women who
opposes commercial surrogacy).
145. Mary Becker, Four Feminist Theoretical Approaches and the Double Bind of Surrogacy, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 303, 305 (1993).
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feminism or hedonic feminism. 146 A pragmatic feminist response to
surrogacy would, instead, consider surrogacy and its real and potential
impact on women, recognizing that women are not similarly situated,
and “make a best guess,” continually reassessing the impact of a
particular policy solution. 147
Described that way, pragmatic theory echoes anti-essentialism, which
recognizes that people’s lives are formed, influenced by, and lived
through multiple identities. As Angela P. Harris explains, both feminist
and legal theory tend to employ “gender essentialism—the notion that a
unitary, ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and described
independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of
experience.” 148 The result of gender essentialism is that the “essential”
woman is invariably white, straight, cisgender, and not poor or an
immigrant. 149 When policy is made using a gender essentialist
framework, experience teaches that the policy will not help—and may
even harm—people who do not fit the essential image.
There are multiple instances of failures of feminist lawmaking to
address the experiences of women of color (and some refreshing
examples of the opposite 150). Kimberlé Crenshaw, in her influential
essay in which she introduced intersectionality theory, explored the
failure of the anti-domestic violence and anti-rape movements to involve
the leadership of African American women and to consider their
communities’ histories of law enforcement oppression.151 Many
feminists, activists, and survivors of violence share Crenshaw’s critique
in a growing movement to reconsider the criminal response to intimate
partner violence. 152
146. Id. at 305.
147. Id. at 309.
148. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
585 (1990).
149. Id.
150. In one recent example, advocates from the domestic violence, LGBTQ, immigrant, and
tribal communities worked together to successfully demand that Congress reauthorize the Violence
Against Women Act in 2013. Advocates did not give in to Congressional pressure to agree to
reauthorization without critical new protections for immigrants, LGBTQ survivors of intimate
partner violence, and increased recognition of tribal sovereignty. See, e.g., Violence Against Women
IMMIGRANT
JUST.
,
https://immigrantjustice.org/
Act
Reauthorization,
NAT’L
VAWAreauthorization (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
151. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 357 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
152. See, e.g., BETH RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICA’S
PRISON NATION (2012); LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2012).

05 - Ainsworth_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete)

12/16/2014 6:28 PM

1106

[Vol. 89:1077

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

The reproductive justice movement offers a similar anti-essentialist
critique of reproductive rights activism and the “pro-choice” movement.
Drawing from anti-essentialism and intersectionality theory,
reproductive justice understands that people’s lives are informed by
multiple identities and affected by multiple oppressions that impact their
ability to make reproductive decisions, ensure their health, and parent
the children they have. 153 Reproductive justice acknowledges that
circumstances like mass incarceration, legacies of colonialism, and
poverty limit the life chances of people and undermine the power of their
communities, rendering “choice” frequently meaningless. 154 Movement
leaders argue that the best way to ensure reproductive justice is to seek
and support the leadership of the people who are most affected by social
policy or practice, especially those most likely to be harmed by those
practices. 155
Considering surrogacy through an anti-essentialist, reproductive
justice lens requires, then, looking to the communities who are most
affected by the practice of surrogacy, and those who are most vulnerable
within it. One of the challenges of supporting the involvement of people
affected in this setting is that the women acting as surrogates, who are
most likely to face the possibility of economic exploitation, are not an
organized or even easily identifiable group. Indeed, in Washington State,
compensated surrogacy has been banned for almost thirty years, so there
are either no women or no women willing to risk a misdemeanor who
could share their experiences of acting as a surrogate for money. 156
Given that challenge, Legal Voice reached out to individual women
acting as surrogates in other states, sought the guidance of reproductive
justice organizations, and evaluated the available empirical evidence
regarding women’s experiences of surrogacy—including the experiences
of women from other countries acting as surrogates for United States
couples. This is not the only strategy, and ideally much more work will

153. JAEL SILLIMAN ET AL., UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 4–5 (2004).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Elena R. Gutierrez, “We Will No Longer Be Silent or Invisible”: Latinas
Organizing for Reproductive Justice, in UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 215, 216–32 (2004).
156. It is not surprising then that in Washington State, intended parents (who contracted with an
out-of-state woman to act as a surrogate) and others—but not women acting as surrogates—testified
in support of proposed surrogacy legislation in Washington State in 2011. Senate Bill Report,
Engrossed 2d Substitute H.R. 1267, Reg. Sess., at 4 (Wash. 2011), available at
https://app.leg.wa.gov/CMD/Handler.ashx?MethodName=getdocumentcontent&documentId=k57G
43OgWwM&att=false.
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be done to consider the voices of women of color, transgender people,
people with disabilities, low-income people, and others affected by the
surrogacy debate. But what we learned was valuable in guiding our
response to proposed surrogacy legislation, in that it clarified for us that,
whatever the feminist debate over surrogacy, the practice is currently
happening and its unregulated state is what is harmful right now. And
additional potential harm will be borne by those with the least economic
resources and the least power—including women in other countries,
where legal protections for women acting as surrogates may be
insufficient to ensure their health, dignity, and safety.
Unlike sex work and drug use, where criminalization itself is actively
and deeply harmful, 157 state bans on compensated surrogacy have not led
to the mass surveillance and imprisonment of intended parents or
surrogates. But that does not mean that we should not advocate for
decriminalization and regulation. The potential harms of surrogacy are
real, and we can address these harms—both current and predictable—by
crafting responsive, progressive legislation.
But, as pragmatic feminism teaches, we may not be able to determine
how each part of our suggested approach will ultimately affect people.
Thus, part of my proposal is that feminists own this issue in the
legislative arena, not just for the first attempt at regulation but through
implementation and the inevitable changes needed to address the ways
that surrogacy may be, or become, problematic. Angela Harris’ critique
of essentialism offers a guide for considering an appropriate legislative
response to surrogacy: “My suggestion is only that we make our
categories explicitly tentative, relational, and unstable, and that to do so
is all the more important in a discipline like law, where abstraction and
‘frozen’ categories are the norm.” 158 Like the categories of identity
Harris explores, the feminist response to assisted reproductive
technologies must be long-term, engaged, “tentative,” and ever
thoughtful of reproductive justice.
Using these principles, Legal Voice determined that the ban on
compensated surrogacy in Washington State is actually harmful, because
it encourages intended parents in this state to go to other states or other
countries. This would not necessarily pose risks if those other states or
nations had robust laws that ensured the humanity and autonomy of
women acting as surrogates. But that is simply not the case. In Illinois,
157. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
COLORBLINDNESS (2012); MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
§ 1:1 (2014).
158. Harris, supra note 148, at 586.
OF
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for example, surrogacy regulation is more progressive in the sense that it
does not exclude same sex couples.159 Yet, it allows for the enforcement
of contract provisions that restrict a pregnant woman’s medical decisionmaking as well as life choices during her pregnancy. 160
The liberal feminist may argue that the woman who contracts away
these rights does so knowingly, and should be respected in her decision
to do so. 161 But there is no principled way to permit intended parents in a
surrogacy arrangement to make the abortion decision, for example, but
to deny that same “dominion” to a husband or male partner who is the
genetic father of the baby a woman carries.162 Further, it is the state
enforcement of such contract terms that create for pregnant women a
second-class status.
Second-class status is precisely the concern reflected in India, where
intended parents from the Global North hire women to carry their babies.
India’s legislative policy encourages these transactions and by doing so
has generated a billion dollar industry. The way these transactions are
encouraged, however, is by making them attractive to potential intended
parents. Part of that attractiveness has to do with the way the law and
practice permit remuneration and legal recognition, without regulating
the practices that undermine women’s liberty or dealing seriously in any
way with the power disparities inherent in these transactions.
Given the reality of this situation, Legal Voice determined that it is
preferable to regulate surrogacy in Washington State, encouraging
people to engage in these transactions locally, under a robust regulatory
scheme. This does not undermine the primary focuses of feminist,
progressive work: creating the conditions for reproductive justice for all
people, addressing economic exclusion, eradicating state and individual
gender-based violence, and more. Rather, local regulation of surrogacy
recognizes that assisted reproductive technologies are a modern reality,
with ongoing complexities that have important implications for women.
Legal Voice determined that local regulation should be informed by a
set of principles, based in pragmatic and anti-essentialist feminism. The
principles guiding such regulation are humanity, equality of power,
159. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(b) (West 2012).
160. Id. 47 / 25(d)(2).
161. See, e.g., Erin Matson, Is Preventing Surrogacy Feminist? No, It’s Anti-Choice, RH
REALITY CHECK (Apr. 11, 2014 4:56 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/04/11/preventingsurrogacy-feminist-anti-choice/.
162. As Justice O’Connor eloquently explained when striking down Pennsylvania’s spousal
notification requirement for abortion, “[a] State may not give to a man the kind of dominion over
his wife that parents exercise over their children.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 898 (1992).
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reproductive autonomy and health, non-discrimination, clarity, and
justice. I will describe each principle below, then return to each principle
in the section that follows, applying each to surrogacy regulation.
A. Humanity
A primary feminist objection to commercial surrogacy is that by
commodifying reproduction, such transactions reduce women’s bodies
to mere vessels. 163 Surrogacy regulation should ensure, within the
context of the compensated transaction, the human dignity of all its
participants. The challenge is moving this principle from semantics, in a
world that remains highly stratified by race, class, and yes, gender, to a
meaningful legislative principle. Moreover, claiming such humanity
does not necessarily address the arguments of feminists who would ban
or discourage surrogacy. Again, the point is not to answer the critiques
and resolve them, but as pragmatists, to recognize that surrogacy
arrangements are a reality with which we must engage if we are to
ensure the humanity of the people who bring children into the world
through surrogacy.
B. Equality of Power
The commodification concern is echoed in the exploitation concern:
that women, especially women of color, who still earn lower wages than
men for comparable work in the United States, 164 and whose earning
power has been increasingly depressed by, among other things, this pay
gap and wealth inequality, 165 are more vulnerable to economic pressures.
The fear is that women in these circumstances will decide to engage in
surrogacy because of those pressures, making a decision they would not
otherwise have made given different options. One way to address this
through a regulatory framework is to attempt, as far as possible, to craft
provisions that elevate the power of the woman acting as surrogate, so
that she and the intended parents approach each other on equal footing.
The hope is that this equality of power in such agreements will help
avert the risks of coercion once the agreement is entered into. Again, like
163. See Rothman, supra note 27, at 1246.
164. See Eileen Patten, On Equal Pay Day, Key Facts About the Gender Pay Gap, PEW RES.
CENTER (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/08/on-equal-pay-dayeverything-you-need-to-know-about-the-gender-pay-gap/.
165. Lifting as We Climb: Women of Color, Wealth, and America’s Future, INSIGHT CENTER FOR
ECON. DEV., at 2 (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.insightcced.org/uploads/CRWG/LiftingAsWeClimbExecutiveSummary-embargoed-0303.pdf.
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the humanity principle, equalizing power within the contract does not
answer the critique that the relationship itself is exploitive, but under a
pragmatic approach, we are not required to resolve that question in order
to address the reality of the complexity of these relationships.
C. Reproductive Autonomy and Health
The principle that the woman acting as surrogate retains her
constitutional and human rights to medical decision-making,
reproductive decisions, and control over her daily life regardless of
whether she is pregnant serves the first two principles. It may be
interesting, in the abstract, to argue over whether a person can contract
away their constitutional rights, 166 but public policy should not
countenance state enforcement of agreements that undermine the
personhood of pregnant women. To do so would simply increase the
already alarming state interventions in pregnant women’s lives in the
United States and affirm the legality of state surveillance and policing of
pregnant women. And, as experience teaches, these agreements would
surely be more readily enforced against women of color. 167 Reproductive
health and decision-making for women, especially low-income women,
women of color, immigrant women, women with disabilities, and
transgender people, are already compromised by numerous state and
federal policies. 168 A key feminist project, informed by principles of
reproductive justice, is to fight those compromises. Thus, no legislation,
in any context, should undermine reproductive autonomy or further
threaten reproductive health.
This does not mean, however, that feminists should encourage or
continue to engage in dialogue about surrogacy in relation to abortion by
relying on disability as an argument for abortion rights. As demonstrated
above, such reliance is demeaning and dehumanizing to people living
with disabilities, and it adds to a public dialogue that wrongly teaches
that people with disabilities lead tragic, difficult lives. 169 Rather, feminist
law reformers should consider how regulation may discriminate against
166. Richard Epstein argued for enforcement, for example, of surrogacy contract provisions
providing the intended father the authority to make the abortion decision: “allowing the surrogate to
carry the child to term against the wishes of its father is inconsistent with the basic contractual
design.” Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2305, 2336 (1995).
167. See ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 246–93; Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 37.
168. See generally SILLIMAN ET AL., supra note 153; Sneha Barot, Governmental Coercion in
Reproductive Decision Making: See It Both Ways, 15 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 7 (2012).
169. See, e.g., Saxton, supra note 117.
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or even deny the existence of people with disabilities.
D. Non-Discrimination
A law that defines the validity of a surrogacy contract will likely
discriminate between people by defining some as capable of being a
party to a surrogacy agreement and others incapable, as is typical in both
contract law (minors, for example, are not generally considered legally
competent to contract) 170 and family law (again, minors, although they
do become parents, are frequently restricted from legal marriage until
they reach a certain age).171 This kind of discrimination between persons
may serve valid, even feminist, public policy goals, including protecting
young children from early marriage or from economic exploitation.
But, all too often in the United States, laws delineate the
circumstances under which a person is recognized as a parent in a
harmful, irrational, discriminatory manner. In some jurisdictions, despite
the significant legal gains of recent years, lesbian and gay parents are
still denied the right to adopt children or to engage in otherwise legally
recognized surrogacy contracts. 172 Moreover, as discussed previously,
people with disabilities are too often seen as incapable of parenting, and
so surrogacy contracts require mental health evaluations, which may be
used for the purpose of denying some people the ability to participate in
such contracts. 173
A feminist principle of anti-discrimination in this setting would look
carefully at any exclusions from participation in surrogacy and consider
whether the exclusion either serves or undermines equality and antisubordination. Those that undermine or further serve to subordinate
groups of people should be eliminated from a regulatory scheme. 174

170. For a succinct overview of the development of the jurisprudence of minors’ decision-making
and contractual rights, see Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution: Responding
to Cognitive Dissonance in the Law’s View of the Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY
L.J. 65, 91 (1999).
171. See Hannah Cartwright, Legal Age of Consent for Marriage and Sex for the 50 United
States, GLOBAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Aug. 21, 2011), http://globaljusticeinitiative.files.wordpress.com/
2011/12/united-states-age-of-consent-table11.pdf.
172. Nicolas, supra note 17.
173. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(4), (b)(3) (West 2012 & Supp. 2013).
174. The question of whether children should have rights to contract or other rights legally coextensive with adults is another complicated question and worthy of much more discussion than I
have space in this Article. The question of age restrictions in surrogacy arrangements is, in my view,
less complicated than the question of age restrictions on voting, speech in the public school setting,
and medical decision-making, where there are strong arguments in favor of eliminating such
restrictions.
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E. Clarity
Clarity is probably the most mundane of the principles addressed
here, but when achieved it too serves the other principles. Unambiguous
rules ensure that people understand precisely what they stand to gain or
lose when engaging in surrogacy agreements. Lack of legal clarity also
opens judicial-decision making to the influence of bias—and, in the
surrogacy context, that bias may reflect antiquated views of women and
motherhood. In the Baby M case, for example, it is understandable that
the trial court, without legislative guidance, struggled to determine how
to apply the law to this set of circumstances. Yet, it appears that the trial
court based much of its analysis on whether or not Mary Beth Whitehead
would be as good a parent as the Sterns, and drew on offensive
stereotypes in drawing its conclusions. 175 Thus, clarity for its own sake
may serve a social good in the setting of surrogacy, hopefully preventing
the breakdown of relationships between the intended parents and the
woman acting as surrogate, and minimizing judicial bias when courts are
called upon to resolve disputes.
F. Justice
Finally, justice—the true meaning of which is a debate beyond the
scope of this Article 176—should be an overarching principle that guides
the development of surrogacy legislation. In many ways, it is the
principle that urges feminist engagement with surrogacy regulation in
the first place, as it is unfair treatment of people, especially women
acting as surrogates, that counsels a legislative response.
IV. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES TO SURROGACY
LEGISLATION
The principles identified above help guide advocacy for a regulatory
response to surrogacy; in the paragraphs that follow, I revisit each
principle and suggest its application to compensated surrogacy
regulation. Of course, like all guidelines, they suggest rather than direct,
and sometimes raise more questions than they answer. Thus, the
recommendations set out below should be viewed as a starting point for
an ongoing, robust, inclusive dialogue—including but not limited to

175. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1259–60 (N.J. 1988) (noting that the trial court and experts
“harshly judged” Ms. Whitehead).
176. See, e.g., MICHAEL SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO (2010).
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academic discourse—about surrogacy regulation.
A. Humanity
One seemingly simple proposition for ensuring people’s humanity is
to change the way we talk about human beings. From reclaiming racial
and gender slurs to movements naming and defining themselves, there is
significant understanding that humanizing language is progress. 177 It
may not help resolve a conflict in court, but, on the other hand, having to
use statutory language that honors people’s humanity may, arguably,
have an influence on judicial decision-making. 178 To that end, Legal
Voice recommended, and the legislative sponsor of Washington State’s
legislation accepted, replacing the terms surrogate, gestational surrogate,
etc., with “woman acting as surrogate.” 179 This mouthful of words may
lack elegance, but it brings to the foreground the human being who is at
the center of this transaction. With this as our starting point, humanity
(like justice) becomes an overarching goal when regulating surrogacy.
B. Equality of Power
The fear that most women acting as surrogates will be low-income
women coerced by economic circumstances into acting as surrogates for
the wealthy has not materialized in the United States. 180 Nonetheless,
economic power is typically skewed toward the intended parents in a
surrogacy agreement. Thus, a way to minimize the possibility of such
exploitation is to use the legal framework to create incentives for the
parties to view each other as full human beings and to equalize power in
these relationships.
This is easier said than done through a legislative scheme (and is,
surely, inadequate to address the economic disparities created by

177. See, e.g., Dorceta E. Taylor, The Rise of the Environmental Justice Paradigm: Injustice
Framing and the Social Construction of Environmental Discourses, 43 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 508, 508
(2000) (explaining the use of framing as a social justice organizing tool in the context of
environmental issues); see also Ashley Parker, Reclaiming the Words that Smear, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
12, 2014, at SR5 (describing women in politics’ coopting gender-based slurs to advance their own
agendas).
178. A discussion of semiotics—the study of both linguistic and other signs and their structures
and processes—is beyond the scope of this paper; for an example of the application of semiotics to
law, see generally Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621
(2004).
179. See H.R. 1267, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(32) (Wash. 2011), available at
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/1267.pdf.
180. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 22.
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economic policy driving the dramatic income inequality 181 in the United
States). But some gains can be achieved by providing for redistribution
in the form of the intended parents paying for independent legal counsel
for the woman acting as surrogate, and paying for her health insurance
and all costs of prenatal care and the woman’s health needs during
pregnancy. 182 Further, the knowledge on the part of the intended parents
that the woman acting as surrogate will retain all health care decisionmaking incentivizes them to treat the woman with respect, and to
consider in advance whether they share similar values about pregnancy,
childbirth, abortion, and long-term relationships between the intended
parents, the child, and the woman acting as surrogate.
C. Reproductive Autonomy and Women’s Health
Ensuring that a woman retains reproductive decision-making should
be a key aspect of any regulatory scheme regarding compensated
surrogacy. Legislation should expressly hold void and unenforceable any
contract provisions that purport to control a pregnant woman’s decisions
during pregnancy—from her constitutionally protected decisions to the
more mundane decisions of daily life, such as whether, when, and how
to exercise, what to eat, and which doctor to see. Surrogacy contracts
should not become another mechanism to undermine the health and
rights of pregnant women.
Surrogacy legislation is also an important place to reaffirm in state
law the fundamental right to decide whether or not to continue a
pregnancy. Affirmation of the abortion right expressly in the law—as
included in the surrogacy regulation bill, House Bill 1267, proposed in
Washington State in 2011 183—gives clear guidance to courts, intended
parents, and women acting as surrogates. Moreover, the law should not
be a vehicle for undermining abortion rights by according legal status to
the fetus; thus, surrogacy legislation should not allow parentage to be
determined prior to the birth of a child.

181. See Drew DeSilver, U.S. Income Inequality, on Rise for Decades, Is Now Highest Since
1928, PEW RES. CENTER (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12/05/u-sincome-inequality-on-rise-for-decades-is-now-highest-since-1928/.
182. Of course, such requirements would help place surrogacy out of reach for people with less
means, who are already less likely to be able to afford surrogacy arrangements.
183. “Nothing in this chapter may be construed to limit or constrain the right of the woman acting
as surrogate to make all health and welfare decisions regarding herself and her pregnancy, including
the right whether or not to terminate the pregnancy as protected by law.” H.R. 1267, 62d Leg., Reg.
Sess. § 57(6)(a) (Wash. 2011), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/
Bills/House%20Bills/1267.pdf.
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Further, as explained above, if women’s health is a priority, then
surrogacy regulation should not insist upon gestational—as opposed to
traditional—surrogacy, as traditional surrogacy imposes fewer health
risks on the pregnant woman. The opposition to allowing traditional
surrogacy is based in a belief that the lack of genetic relationship will
make it easier for the women acting as surrogate to give up the child,
and will make it easier for the intended parents to establish their legal
relationship to the child. These are untenable assumptions, in that the
first is not borne out by the experiences of women acting as surrogates,
and the second has nothing to do with the law as it should be, but only
the law as it is. Further, as explained above, traditional surrogacy may
best protect women’s health. For these reasons, and because progressive
feminism recognizes that genetic relationship is not determinative of
bonds of love and affection between people, traditional surrogacy should
be recognized in the regulation of compensated surrogacy.
Finally, the health consequences to the woman acting as surrogate —
particularly the risks posed by multiple embryo transfer in gestational
surrogacy arrangements—should be addressed. Multiple embryo transfer
poses health risks to the woman, increasing the likelihood of a multiple
pregnancy. 184 The pressure to produce a pregnancy may induce
physicians and intended parents to insist on multiple embryo transfer, 185
despite the American Society of Reproductive Medicine’s
recommendations to limit the numbers of attempts as well as the
numbers of embryos transferred to the woman’s uterus. 186 To address
this, surrogacy legislation should—like proposed Washington State
House Bill 1267—require surrogacy contracts to ensure that the health
care providers involved in the surrogacy process follow the guidelines of
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine. 187
D. Non-Discrimination
Putting the non-discrimination principle into practice in crafting

184. See The Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med. & the Practice Comm. of the
Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. Tech., Criteria for Number of Embryos to Transfer: A Committee
Opinion, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 44, 45 (2013) [hereinafter Criteria for Number of Embryos to
Transfer].
185. See, e.g., Lewin, supra note 133, at A1 (reporting on a California surrogacy lawyer who was
approached by a client from outside the United States, who wanted the woman acting as surrogate to
have six embryos transferred; the lawyer refused to work with him).
186. See Criteria for Number of Embryos to Transfer, supra note 184.
187. H.R. 1267, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 57 (3)(a)(i) (Wash. 2011), available at
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/1267.pdf.
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progressive surrogacy legislation raises some challenging questions.
Surrogacy laws in the United States contain a variety of restrictions on
eligibility to participate as intended parents and as surrogates. Both
parties generally must be adults to participate. 188 It is typical to require
both parties to have a mental health evaluation, and for the woman
acting as surrogate to have a physical health evaluation as well.189
Washington’s proposed legislation would have limited eligibility to act
as a surrogate to women who have already given birth to at least one
child. 190 Other laws allow only married couples to become intended
parents, 191 or limit surrogacy to those who can demonstrate that they are
either medically or socially infertile.192
Some of these restrictions are very troubling from a feminist
perspective. The most obvious discrimination is against LGBTQ parents,
in those states that limit availability of surrogacy arrangements to legally
married couples and where marriage equality is not yet recognized. But
it is similarly demeaning of single people, regardless of sexual
orientation, to suggest that they should not have access to this route to
procreation. It also undermines reproductive autonomy to restrict the
reasons that a person may engage in surrogacy, i.e., by restricting its
availability to people that are “infertile.” Feminists should be gravely
concerned when a legal restriction is based on stereotypes of women, as
this one certainly is, suggesting that some women have vacuous, trivial,
or wrong-headed reasons for their procreative decisions. 193

188. The Supreme Court of Connecticut considered surrogacy laws in various jurisdictions in
Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 802 n.40 (Conn. 2011) (“For example, Florida requires that both
the gestational carrier and the intended parents be eighteen years or older. Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 742.15(1) (West 2010). Illinois requires that the gestational carrier must be at least twenty-one
years of age. 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 47 / 20 (a)(1) (West 2009). New Hampshire requires that all
parties to the contract must be at least twenty-one years of age. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 168–B:17 (I)
(2002).”).
189. Id. at 803 n.46.
190. Wash. H.R. 1267 § 56 (1)(b).
191. Raftopol, 12 A.3d at 802 n.38. As of 2011, Florida, Nevada, and Texas expressly required
intended parents to be married; Arkansas law requires marriage, in effect, by permitting only a
biological intended father to have parental rights through a surrogacy arrangement, unless he was
married; in that case, his wife would have parental rights regardless of biological relationship. Id.
192. Id. at 802 n.39.
193. See, e.g., Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion DecisionMaking, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 225 (2009) (“In no other area of healthcare does the
State override a competent adult’s right to consent to a medical procedure that falls within the
bounds of proven and accepted medical practice, and in fact may be physically safer for the patient,
based on the State’s unsubstantiated view that the treatment will be psychologically harmful to the
patient. The law only subjects the gender-specific abortion decision to this kind of doubt about
patient decision-making capacity, therefore denying that women have the same ability as men to
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Thus, surrogacy legislation should ensure that these arrangements are
open to adult people regardless of marital status, sexual orientation, or
their reasons for seeking a surrogacy arrangement. The more challenging
issues are whether age restrictions, health restrictions, and experiences
of previous childbirth are valid restrictions. Applying our guidelines
discussed above, the question is whether these restrictions either advance
or undermine equality and principles of anti-subordination.
Age restrictions are a common feature of United States law and
jurisprudence. Feminist law reformers attempt to balance the procreative
autonomy of teens and young girls and their rights not to be treated or
seen in law as property of adults, with protection from the vulnerabilities
imposed by the dependency of children on adults. 194 Surrogacy, as many
commentators have explained, is an unusual mix of contract and family
law, in a context of evolving technology and lack of regulation.195
Reconsidering rules that protect children from exploitation is not within
the scope of this Article, but the question is an important one. Legal
Voice, in its work on the proposed Washington State surrogacy
legislation, determined to accept the twenty-one and over age restriction,
recognizing (pragmatically) that evolution in this area may require
reevaluation.
Similarly, Legal Voice accepted a restriction that required a woman
acting as surrogate to have had one prior birth. Again, this was a
pragmatic decision based on what appears to be the practice of women
acting as surrogates. The women we talked with, the women in empirical
studies, and the women whose experiences are reported in case law and
in the media, usually came to the decision to act as a surrogate after
having had at least one child of their own. 196 Nonetheless, we
approached this provision with some hesitation, seeing it as potentially
essentializing (only women who have had children could understand
what it means to act as a surrogate) as well as paternalistic (women’s
thought processes are emotional and the only way they can know
whether they can give up a child through surrogacy is through having
make informed healthcare decisions.” (emphasis in original)).
194. See, e.g., Katheryn D. Katz, The Pregnant Child’s Right to Self-Determination, 62 ALB. L.
REV. 1119, 1162 (1999) (critiquing parental involvement in abortion laws as impositions on minors’
medical decision-making and suggesting different standards for judicial bypass of parental notice in
the states that require parental involvement).
195. See Stark, supra note 82.
196. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 22 (“Women who decide to embark on surrogacy often have
completed a family of their own and feel that they wish to help a couple who would not otherwise
be able to become parents.” (quoting Vasai Jadva et al., Surrogacy: The Experience of Surrogate
Mothers, 18 HUM. REPROD. 2196 (2003)).
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had their own child). It also suggests that the potential for regret should
be the basis of public policy, an idea that is also deeply paternalistic and
strongly echoes the troubling views of women’s decision-making
demonstrated in abortion jurisprudence. 197 Ideally, this provision would
not be included, to deter the view of women as incapable of making
informed decisions.
Finally, the mental and physical health evaluation requirements for all
parties or just the surrogate, present in many state laws, troubled us as
well. First, if the tests are required simply to give the parties information
about each other, such an exchange could be helpful. But the purpose of
these provisions are unclear: are the provisions intended purely for the
information of the parties, or are they intended to weed out from
surrogacy people with certain mental health or physical conditions?
Legal Voice settled on agreeing to mutual screening provisions that
seemed designed to give the parties information, but arguing against a
provision that expressly excluded women with mental health diagnoses
from participation as surrogates, because such provisions stigmatize
people with mental health conditions—a stigma to which women are
particularly vulnerable. 198
E. Clarity
The provisions above tend to increase clarity, but this principle is
most important when considering one of the most controversial aspects
of surrogacy legislation: whether the law should recognize the intended
parents as the child’s parents at birth, without giving the woman acting
as surrogate a designated time period in which to change her mind and
void that aspect of the contract. Many argue that surrogacy legislation, if
it is to exist at all, should treat surrogacy like adoption: the intended
parents must pass a home inspection, like those required for adoptive
parents; and the woman acting as surrogate has the right, typically within
forty-eight hours of the birth of the child, to change her mind and retain

197. The problem, of course, is that a person may regret any number of life decisions, but it is
only women’s decisions that are the subject of regulation. See Planned Parenthood of Heartland v.
Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1045 n.12 (D. Neb. 2010) (“The most important choices have
consequences, and no matter how well-reasoned and fully deliberated, those decisions can lead to
remorse. That is part of the price we pay for our freedom. (Only Edith Piaf was without regret. Had
she been sober, she, too, might have had second-thoughts.)”).
198. See Levent Kuey, Stigma, Women, and Mental Health, in OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF WOMEN
AND MENTAL HEALTH 3, 5 (Dora Kohen ed., 2011) (“Being a woman with mental ill health puts the
person under a double burden of discrimination.”).
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legal rights to the child. 199 Others note, correctly, that parents who can
conceive a child with a partner bear no such burdens; there are no
controls on the quality of their home, and they are not required to
undergo evaluations. Those who make this argument suggest that people
having children through surrogacy are similarly situated to those parents,
rather than to adoptive parents. 200
Those arguing on behalf of the woman acting as surrogate argue that
her motherhood is a reality, and that parental rights—that she may
voluntarily extinguish—should attach to the child born through a
surrogacy arrangement, whether or not the woman acting as surrogate
contributed the gametes for conception. Thus, the law should recognize
both sets of rights—her own and the intended parents’—to potential
parenthood, and create a system that either allows them to keep these
rights coextensively, or terminates one set in favor of the other.201
Typically, the proposed system is much like the adoption scheme
described above, where the woman has a statutory waiting period in
which to decide whether to voluntarily terminate or maintain her
parental rights.
Legal Voice determined, and this Article recommends, supporting
surrogacy legislation that unequivocally recognizes the parental rights of
the intended parent immediately upon the birth of the child, with no
revocation period for the woman acting as surrogate. This decision was
not reached without controversy, and it may be one of the hardest
questions for feminist law reformers to resolve, once they decide to
engage in regulating surrogacy. All sides offer persuasive arguments
based in sound feminist principles. 202 Again, Legal Voice rested its
decision on a pragmatic feminist approach, relying on the evidence so
far gleaned from people who have engaged in surrogacy arrangements,
and from an assessment of the various risks and responsibilities that each
type of regulatory response would entail.
That evidence indicates—as can be extrapolated from the relatively
low number of reported legal disputes in surrogacy arrangements—that
the vast majority of women acting as surrogates voluntarily, and most
often, happily, plan to and do give the child to the intended parents. 203
199. See Shapiro, supra note 84.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Andrews, supra note 11, at 2350–52 (showing her interviews with numerous women
acting as surrogates revealed a sense of satisfaction and little conflict with the intended parents);
supra Part II.A. But see Janet Cawley, Surrogate Moms Fight the “Slavery,” CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1,
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Women acting as surrogates generally do not see themselves as having
parental ties or rights, although they do retain a belief that they have a
special connection to the child and may want to maintain some kind of
ongoing relationship. 204 Throughout the pregnancy, they actively
maintain an emotional distance, perhaps better characterized as a unique
emotional relationship to the pregnancy. 205 Thus, as a practical matter, a
revocation period is typically not necessary.
But a revocation period could be potentially harmful to the woman
acting as surrogate (and the child). Since most women acting as
surrogates do so with no intention of having to care for and raise the
child, the waiting period in which they have parental rights to the child
places them at risk of the intended parents changing their minds, and
leaving them with that unintended and unwanted responsibility. As noted
above, the unrelenting negative discourse directed at having and or
raising a baby with a disability poses the risk—apparently very real 206—
that the intended parents would balk at raising a child with a disability
out of misinformation and fear, and decide not to invoke their potential
parental rights. Although it is not just new babies with disabilities that
could be left with women acting as surrogates—a change in the
circumstances of the intended parents, such as a death or divorce, could
also lead them to change their mind about raising the baby. Although
this scenario is a very uncommon, it as just as likely as the very
uncommon scenario in which the woman acting as surrogate changes her
mind. 207
In my view, the rights of all parties, including the child, are better
protected when the law is unequivocal about parental rights and
responsibilities upon the child’s birth. The child is never left parentless;
the intended parents are both assured of and required to assume their
parental obligations; and the woman acting as surrogate knows in
1987, at 1–2 (reporting on the formation of a national coalition against surrogacy, led by a man and
joined by three women, including Mary Beth Whitehead, who had been surrogates, regretted it, and
opposed legal enforcement of surrogacy contracts).
204. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 67–73.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Beth Greenfield, California Couple Shares Surrogate Story in Wake of Thailand
Controversy, YAHOO! HEALTH (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.yahoo.com/health/california-coupleshares-surrogate-story-in-wake-of-95207128652.html (reporting the story of Keston and Andrea
Ott-Dahl, a California couple who had agreed that Andrea would be a surrogate mother for another
lesbian couple who were having trouble getting pregnant. When that couple learned that the baby
would be born with Down Syndrome, they balked and refused to go through with the agreement.
Andrea refused to abort the baby, with her partner’s agreement, and they kept and are raising the
child).
207. See Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 35–38.
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advance exactly what will happen when she agrees to act as a surrogate,
and is never left with parental responsibility for a child she did not
intend to raise. At the same time, the arguments for recognizing
pregnancy as a meaningful relationship to the child are also valid; for
this reason, surrogacy legislation should provide for an
acknowledgement to the child of its parentage and birth, and the right of
the woman acting as surrogate to maintain some level of connection to
the family and the resulting child. 208
F. Justice
Finally, we reach the most difficult question: how do we ensure
justice in surrogacy regulation when social and economic realities
constrain the procreative lives of so many? As Dorothy Roberts
explains, “[p]rocreative liberty cannot be separated from concerns about
equality. In fact, the very meaning of reproductive liberty is inextricably
intertwined with issues of social justice.” 209 We must be extremely
careful when government sanction, legal rules, economic inequality, and
the meaning of parenting, family, and motherhood collide.
One method, suggested by Dorothy Roberts, is to increase access to
reproductive technologies, and to devote resources to addressing the root
causes of infertility. Progressive feminists should work to create a world
in which people’s reproductive health is valued and supported, and
surrogacy decisions, when they happen, are reached in a context of
equality between intended parents and the woman acting as surrogate.
Unfortunately, it remains the case that communities of color and those
with fewer resources are more likely, for a variety of reasons, to
experience problems with infertility, but are the least likely to have the
resources to employ assisted reproductive technologies. 210
Progressive surrogacy regulation would attempt to engender equality
by creating systems for increasing resources to the communities that
need access to these technologies. For example, a surrogacy bill could
include funding for a legislative mandate to increase research on
environmental causes of disparate fertility rates, and to support programs
208. I recognize that this is a bald statement that begs additional analysis. From a reproductive
justice perspective, this question is best answered by considering the experiences of women acting
as surrogates and the children born of surrogacy arrangements, as well as the needs of intended
parents raising those children.
209. ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 287.
210. See Tanzina Vega, Infertility, Endured Through a Prism of Race, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
2014, at A12 (explaining that married black women are twice as likely as married white women to
face infertility, but significantly less likely to access fertility services).
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that research and respond to the reproductive health care disparities—
including maternal mortality, rates of miscarriage and stillbirth, and
premature birth—experienced by women of color. Efforts to regulate
compensated surrogacy should be accompanied by policies that provide
for maternal mortality reviews, increase funding to map access points to
prenatal and neonatal care, ensure prenatal care for immigrants, and
improve culturally aware services and language access. 211
Arguably, regulating surrogacy in the states will also help increase
justice for women in other countries, by encouraging surrogacy to take
place locally. Local surrogacy will allow for closer monitoring and study
of its effects on women acting as surrogates (and other parties and
children, too). It is hard to predict whether and how that will increase
protections for women in other countries—it could, in the short term,
have the effect of making women agree to engage in surrogacy for even
less compensation if there are fewer intended parents seeking their
services. But it is not surrogacy that is at the root of Global North
exploitation of Global South countries, people, and women’s bodies. 212
Reproductive tourism is but a highly visible symptom of a much greater
problem—a problem that is also a feminist and progressive imperative to
address.
Finally, there is a local injustice that local surrogacy regulation can
readily address: the problem of third party brokers, 213 who, with few
exceptions, are entirely unregulated. Lawyers and doctors are subject to
ethical rules that limit, somewhat, their ability to freely broker these
kinds of exchanges, but brokers who lack professional licenses face no
such limitations. 214 As explained above, this has led to situations in
which brokers have stolen from or made false assurances to people,

211. See, e.g., FLEDA MASK JACKSON, JOINT CTR. POLITICAL & ECON. STUDIES HEALTH POLICY
INST., RACE, STRESS, AND SOCIAL SUPPORT: ADDRESSING THE CRISIS IN BLACK INFANT
MORTALITY 7 (2007) (recommending policies that promote cultural competence, access, and
improve and fund necessary research); NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., REFORM MATTERS: HEALTH
REFORM: AN OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE HEALTH DISPARITIES AMONG WOMEN (2008), available at
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Health%20Reform%20An%20Opportunity.pdf
(reviewing
health disparities and outlining several strategies to reduce inequality of health and access to health
care); Access to Healthcare, BLACK WOMEN’S HEALTH IMPERATIVE, http://www.bwhi.org/
issues/healthcare/access-to-healthcare/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) (highlighting the importance of
initiatives that increase access to health care and health insurance).
212. Rather, legacies of colonialism, trade policies, and other conditions have helped spur the
reproductive tourism market. See, e.g., Birthing a Market, supra note 26, at 8 (“As pointed out in
the Global Health Watch 3 Report, the lopsided free trade mandate brushes aside all ethical
questions in the expanding ‘bio-capital’ industry.”).
213. See Sanger, supra note 138.
214. See Lewin, supra note 139.
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putting women’s health at risk. Progressive legislation should require
government regulation of third party brokers in order to decrease their
economic incentives and limit their ability to exploit the parties to these
arrangements. There are several ways to accomplish this end: prohibiting
payment to third parties, licensing them in the manner of adoption
agencies, or regulating their conduct short of licensing. Thus far, in all
states where surrogacy is legal save California, surrogacy law does not
address the role of brokers in surrogacy arrangements.
Ultimately, progressive surrogacy legislation, guided by the principles
outlined above, would: include respectful language and provisions that
allow for both traditional and gestational surrogacy; be inclusive of
LGBTQ people and non-stigmatizing towards people with mental health
conditions or disabilities; impose regulations on brokers that prevent
abuse; directly address social conditions that increase health disparities,
especially maternal health; ensure clarity by recognizing the parental
rights of intended parents upon the birth of the child; and ensure
women’s health, medical, and reproductive decision-making.
CONCLUSION
Progressives have many pressing concerns—including addressing
unchecked income inequality, protecting our democracy from purchase,
ending mass incarceration and the violent and unjust policing of
communities of color, and achieving justice for immigrants. Surrogacy
affects fewer people, but if progressives ignore the issue and leave
ownership to others, women’s voices are coopted and legislatures and
courts may enact harmful rules that undermine reproductive justice.
Having a baby for someone else in exchange for money is—and will
be seen as—a women’s issue. Women’s rights leaders in the legal and
legislative arenas should take leadership and work to pass legislation that
honors women’s humanity, recognizes reproductive autonomy, affirms
the rights of all people to form loving families and attachments, and
directs resources at health care disparities. In the process, feminist
leaders can move the conversation away from dehumanizing people with
disabilities and essentializing women, to an inclusive framework that
recognizes the complexities and intersecting identities of all. These ideas
for progressive surrogacy legislation are a call to feminist law reformers
to take ownership of surrogacy regulation, both despite and because of
its complexities, and lead the way to reform that is pragmatic and
grounded in principles of reproductive justice.

